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Executive summary  
This study investigates how the French government uses multi-bi aid to complement 
its bilateral and multilateral aid and compares the allocation behavior with other major 
donor countries. Multi-bi aid refers to earmarked funding to multilateral organizations 
and must be distinguished from bilateral aid and multilateral aid. Multilateral aid may 
be provided on a mandatory or voluntary basis but is always pooled and supports all 
activities of the multilateral organizations.  In contrast, multi-bi aid supports rather 
narrow activities to be implemented by multilateral organizations and often requires 
special reporting to donor countries. The massive increase of multi-bi aid over the 
last two decades raises questions about the reasons for this surge, about the value-
added to the multilateral aid system and its implications for recipient countries, the 
operations of multilateral organizations, and the financing of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. This study only touches upon the ongoing and important debate 
about these questions with implications for all donor countries. The focus of the 
paper is to assess whether the French multi-bi cooperation is complementary to its 
bilateral aid and consistent with overall French aid policy goals. French usage of 
multi-bi aid is then compared to both the other European Union (EU) donors and the 
member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)3 using 
document analysis and statistical analysis based on new data on the evolution of 
multi-bi aid (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) covering 23 DAC donors over 
23 years. 
The first part of the study reviews the strategy and actors of French development 
assistance and discusses how the allocation of bilateral and multilateral aid matches 
with these strategic objectives. The second part of the study compares the allocation 
patterns of the French government to other major donor countries and attempts to 
assess the role multi-bi aid takes in the French aid system. Most notably, France has 
used multi-bi aid to a lesser extent than the average DAC donor over the last two 
decades. In recent years, the share of French multi-bi aid as of its classic bilateral aid 
(5%) was more than three times smaller than the average share among other DAC 
and EU donors. In contrast, French usage of the bilateral channel is only slightly 
smaller than the DAC average according to a new multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer 
and Reinsberg, 2015) that improves upon the OECD-DAC data. France not only 
provides less earmarked aid than many other donors. Also, its earmarking is less 
tight by imposing fewer restrictions on the aid sectors than both the average DAC 
donor and also the average EU donor. However, a very high share of French multi-bi 
has a geographic earmark. More than 80% of its multi-bi aid is earmarked for a 
specific country, as opposed to only 50% for EU donors and 60% for DAC donors. 
The sector distribution of the multi-bi aid portfolios of France and the other donor 
groupings are strikingly different. First, France uses multi-bi aid comparatively less to 
provide humanitarian aid than the average DAC and EU donor (11% vs. 18% for EU 
                                                          
3
 Data for 22 DAC donors and thereof 13 EU donors are available for the full time period in the 
Creditor Reporting System. These donors are AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHE, DNK, DEU, ESP, FIN, 
GBR, GRC, ITA, ISL, JPN, KOR, LUX, NED, NOR, NZL, PRT, SWE, USA.  
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donors and 28% for DAC donors). This difference may be due to France’s strong 
local presence and bilateral capacities to respond to humanitarian crisis. France 
allocates a larger fraction of its multi-bi aid to commodity assistance and debt relief 
rather than productive sectors and multi-sector aid. French multi-bi aid and bilateral 
aid is allocated similarly across sectors, which raises the question whether these 
funding channels are complementary in geographic terms rather than within different 
sectors of the same recipient country. We find that multi-bi aid is geographically more 
focused than bilateral aid and focuses on fewer countries whereof a few countries 
receive the bulk of funds. The African continent and regional activities receive a 
relatively higher share than in bilateral aid.  
France also differs from the other donor groupings in terms of the type of multi-bi aid 
provided. Most of French multi-bi aid is channeled through global or vertical funds 
that the responsible ministry – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Development (MAEDI) – considers as important channels for fulfilling French sector 
priorities and assuring donor coordination. However, a recent meta-study of the 
available evidence on the alignment of multi-donor trust funds with the principles of 
the Paris Declaration has found increased ownership in most cases but ambiguous 
results with regard to harmonization and managing for results (Barakat et al. 2012). A 
MAEDI report acknowledges that global funds may potentially undermine the 
coherence of the multilateral system. France complements its sector priorities 
through substantial contributions to nine global funds with mandates in education 
(1 fund), health (4 funds) and the environment (4 funds), particularly focusing on 
climate funds. Beyond financial clout, France influences policy in these sectors 
through (rotating) seats in the governing bodies of these new multilateral institutions.  
France also contributes to trust funds hosted by international development 
organizations, albeit to a smaller extent than other major donors in relative and 
absolute terms. Data availability limits the analysis to the World Bank-managed rust 
funds. France engages mostly in well-established multi-donor trust funds, except for 
a small number of single-donor initiatives. France hence does not seem to wish to 
maneuver the Bank into unchartered territory, as opposed to some other donors (IEG 
2011). This is laudable given the controversy around “advocacy trust funds” inside 
the World Bank (Reinsberg 2015), and the evidence that single-donor trust funds 
increase fragmentation while multi-donor trust funds have improved donor 
coordination at least in some cases (Barakat et al. 2012). We also find that some 
trust funds are supported by more than one French aid institution. This pattern of 
multiple French funding sources for the same multilateral institution suggests that 
France may want to improve the coordination of multi-bi aid across agencies and 
develop an overarching trust fund engagement policy.  
Using various multivariate statistical methods, this study attempts to establish some 
robust determinants of the multi-bi use by donor countries and examine how 
explanatory factors differ between bilateral, multilateral and multi-bi aid. Despite 
careful choice of methods, results only represent systematic relationships and do not 
allow claims about causality. Through systematic testing of sixteen hypotheses 
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derived from reports, interviews and the literature, we establish robust evidence for 
three hypotheses and find an additional four factors to be related to the size of multi-
bi aid budgets for a sample of 23 donor countries over the 1990-2012 period. Most 
robustly, we find that internationally engaged donors provide more multi-bi, bilateral 
and multilateral aid (Hypothesis 1). If political motives in aid allocation loom large, a 
donor provides less multi-bi aid (Hypothesis 10). Our straightforward interpretation of 
this finding is that politically motivated aid is preferably implemented bilaterally rather 
than delegated to a multilateral organization. We further find robust evidence that 
donors with an active multilateral policy provide less multi-bi aid in average, possibly 
because they are more aware of the, mostly negative, implications for multilateral 
organizations (Hypothesis 16). There is also evidence that European Union members 
provide less multi-bi aid on average, which could be due to the fact that they already 
provide substantial amounts of “multilateral” aid through the European Union budget 
(Hypothesis 4). Incoming aid ministers tend to reduce the flows of multi-bi aid 
(Hypothesis 8). Multi-bi aid is more easily reduced than other budget items and can 
thus be re-allocated to support the bilateral aid priorities of the minister. There is also 
substantial evidence that multi-bi aid budgets are higher in more transparent donor 
countries (Hypothesis 9) with an independent aid agency that is relatively removed 
from daily politics (Hypothesis 14). 
Multi-bi aid is found to be related to quite different variables than multilateral and 
bilateral aid budgets which are relatively similar. Most strikingly, multilateral and 
bilateral aid budgets are larger when aid is more politicized while multi-bi aid is 
reduced (Hypothesis 10).  
We also examined the determinants of multi-bi aid for France and nine major donor 
countries separately. Due to the small number of observations for each donor, results 
of this part of the analysis must be interpreted particularly cautiously. We find that in 
a majority of major donor countries, multi-bi aid is associated with the multi-bi 
behavior of donor peers (Hypothesis 5). This relationship is not observed for the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom which are leading providers of multi-bi aid. 
Otherwise, French multi-bi aid is motivated by quite different factors than in other 
major donor countries. French multi-bi aid seems to be motivated by allocation 
preferences that differ from the consensus-based aid allocation of the World Bank’s 
concessional arm, the International Development Association (IDA) (Hypothesis 3). 
Moreover, left-wing governments provide more multi-bi aid while in average incoming 
aid ministers decrease the multi-bi budget (Hypothesis 6). While the statistical 
modelling of French motivations for multi-bi aid highlights some explanatory factors, 
we suggest using qualitative research to determine additional and France-specific 
motivations for the use of multi-bi aid. This is beyond what quantitative data analysis 
can accomplish due to the statistical problems resulting from the small number of 
observations. 
The rising multi-bi contributions of several large donor countries challenges existing 
funding models of multilateral organizations, which France – as an important 
contributor to multilateral organization – should follow closely. Over the last two 
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decades, French aid institutions have provided comparatively little resources as 
multi-bi aid. French multi-bi aid is mostly channeled through global funds in health, 
education, or climate change, or provided to well-established multi-donor trust funds 
that are known to be less problematic in terms of increasing the overhead costs of 
aid delivery. However, many questions about the role and value-added of these new 
funding vehicles in the international aid architecture remain. In the French aid 
bureaucracy, there seems to be policy space for improving the coordination of multi-
bi funding across ministries and to systematically ascertain the complementary use of 
multi-bi, bilateral and multilateral channels to ultimately limit within-donor 
fragmentation. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last decade, earmarked contributions from official donors to multilateral 
organizations increased fourfold (see Figure 1), the bulk of this multi-bi aid being 
received by the World Bank and United Nations agencies. Multi-bi aid is aid 
implemented by multilateral organizations but its use is restricted to specific 
countries, sectors or themes by donor countries (OECD 2011: 28). In contrast, 
traditional multilateral aid pools donor contributions which are then allocated at the 
discretion of the multilateral governing bodies. Donors may provide earmarked or 
non-core funding through two channels: directly to the multilateral organization 
through a variety of trust fund types involving one or several ‘like-minded’ donors, or 
indirectly through the financing of global or vertical funds4 with narrow mandates that 
use multilateral organizations as implementers.5 This makes vertical funds effectively 
to “pass-through” multilaterals. The way we identify indirect earmarked aid as multi-bi 
aid differs from the Donor Assistance Committee (DAC)’s at the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as we explain below.6  The rise of 
multi-bi aid is associated with the Millennium Development Goals and the Paris 
Declaration principles for enhanced aid effectiveness. Set up in the spirit of these 
international agreements, some types of multi-bi aid, such as global funds and multi-
donor trust funds for post-crisis countries, offer opportunities for improved donor 
coordination, allow for more inclusive governance structures, and may increase the 
rapidness of the international response to humanitarian needs or emerging 
challenges (IEG 2011, World Bank 2013). Trust funds also allow donors including 
multilateral organizations to jointly engage in contexts in which they would otherwise 
not be willing to engage or where multilaterals are restricted by their legal mandate 
(IEG 2011). However, evidence about the advantages of these funds is still largely 
lacking and inconclusive (for multi-donor trust funds see (Barakat, Rzeszut, and 
Martin 2012). Moreover, the rise of these financing structures and of single-donor 
trust funds in particular risk creating new inefficiencies in the multilateral system due 
to duplication (The 1818 Society 2012, Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 
2015), by “undermin[ing] the strategic and coherent allocation of resources for 
individual multilateral organisations” (Tortora and Steensen 2014: 4) and increase the 
influence of individual donor’s interest in the multilateral organization (OECD 2011, 
IEG 2011). The sheer number of these funds, more than 900 at the World Bank, 
generates administrative expenses that could be spent more productively in 
developing countries. An overall assessment of multi-bi aid is highly complex if not 
                                                          
4
 The OECD defines global funds as “large multi-country funds that contain a significant element of 
earmarked funding for specific objectives with thematic, sectoral, or sub-sectoral coverage” (OECD 
2011: 74). Other definitions include even more characteristic features (Isenman and Shakow 2010: 7; 
Sridhar and Woods 2012: 8-11; UNDP 2012: 15-16). 
5
 The OECD has used multi-bi aid to refer to “voluntary external assistance from donors for a 
multilateral agency which is supplementary to core membership contributions and which is earmarked 
for specific purposes” (OECD 2005: 102). In general, earmarking might apply to a sector, theme, 
country, or region (OECD 2010). 
6
 The OECD revised its 2005 definition in 2010 to add that multilateral aid also encompasses 
contributions to a “fund managed by such [an international] agency [that conducts all or part of its 
activities in favor of development].”  
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impossible as the efficiency and effectiveness of multi-bi aid must be assessed at the 
level of the donor country, the multilateral organization, and the recipient country and 
compared to the traditional two channels for official development assistance, 
multilateral or bilateral aid. 
Figure 1: Evolution of multi-bi aid (1990-2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015). 
The recent growth in the use of the multilateral aid system has primarily been driven 
by multi-bi aid. The 19 billion USD in multi-bi aid that were provided in 2012 amount 
to almost 60% of multilateral aid and to about 20% of bilateral aid (Reinsberg, 
Michaelowa and Eichenauer 2015). A third of the World Bank budget is now 
earmarked and shares are substantially higher for several large UN agencies 
(Tortora and Steensen 2014). The high share of earmarked funding results in a lack 
of resources and autonomy to undertake multilateral “core activities” like, among 
others, knowledge generation and the development of international standards 
(Graham 2015; UN 2012). Figure 1 displays the rise of multi-bi aid over the last two 
decades and is based on the new multi-bi aid data set as are most graphs of this 
study (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015). The data set allows for a description of 
donors’ earmarking behaviour with respect to geographic or sector earmarking and 
the earmarking depth of contributions and it extends the availability of multi-bi aid 
data back to 1990.  
The growing importance of earmarking funding requires individual donor countries to 
be aware of and respond to the practice of multi-bi aid by their peers. At the 
international level, scaling up existing pooled funding mechanisms or establishing 
new ones are proposed for financing the Sustainable Development Goals and figure 
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high on the agenda at international conferences (for example the Financing for 
Development Conference in Addis Ababa, July 2015).  
This study examines the French use of multi-bi aid and compares its practice with 
other donors in the European Union (EU) and the DAC donors. Figure 2 shows that 
donors used multi-bi aid to different extents over the 2006-2012 period. While 
Norway and Canada spent more than 20% of their foreign assistance as multi-bi aid, 
this figure is less than 5% for South Korea and Japan. Proportionally to their aid 
budgets, France and Germany are the third-last and fourth-last users of multi-bi aid 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Relative use of multi-bi aid by donor countries (2006-2012) 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015). 
 
When evaluating potential impacts of multi-bi aid on the multilateral system, the 
absolute size of donor countries’ multi-bi aid budgets is more informative than its 
respective share in aid. Figure 3 shows the amounts of multi-bi aid by donor 
countries for the year 2012. Multi-bi aid therein includes the donor contributions to 
pass-through multilaterals that ultimately become earmarked aid. The figure shows 
that the largest donor in terms of total aid – the United States – also commits the 
largest amount of multi-bi aid. It is followed by a group of donors with similarly high 
amounts of multi-bi aid, namely the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and Norway. 
France and Germany are situated in the middle of the distribution, still behind the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Australia. 
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Figure 3: Amounts of multi-bi aid by donor countries (2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015).  
 
This study goes beyond these descriptive statistics and uses advanced statistical 
methods to study the determinants of multi-bi aid across donor countries and over 
time. We use the Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2015) multi-bi aid dataset that extends 
the OECD/DAC Creditor Report System (CRS) data on bilateral aid activities back to 
1990, corrects for some coding errors in the original data and includes only genuinely 
earmarked contributions.7 Figure 20 shows that the data slightly differ and that the 
evolution of multi-bi aid flows from 1990-2012 is traced more smoothly by the multi-bi 
aid data than the CRS data set. 
The next section lays the ground for studying the French use of multi-bi aid by 
identifying its actors and policy goals in terms of sectors and geography and 
examining the current French bilateral and multilateral aid practices. The third section 
compares the French use of multi-bi aid with its own bilateral and multilateral 
allocation as well as with other EU donors and DAC donors. Sections four and five 
seek to explain the varying extent of multi-bi aid by DAC donors. Section 4 develops 
sixteen hypotheses and uses simply bivariate associations to assess their plausibility. 
Section 5 presents the results from multivariate analysis. It first examines the 
determinants of multi-bi aid by the average donor using panel regression methods 
and Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). The determinants of multi-bi aid are then 
compared to factors influencing the volume of multilateral and bilateral aid using 
                                                          
7
 See Codebook: Eichenauer, Vera Z. and Bernhard Reinsberg (2014), Multi-bi aid: Tracking the 
evolution of earmarked funding to international development organizations from 1990 to 2012. 
www.aiddata.org. 
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Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Using ridge regression, the section also 
includes an analysis of the factors underlying multi-bi aid for ten donors including 
France. Section six concludes. 
 
2.  The French aid architecture 
This section reviews the key features of the French aid architecture. In a first step, we 
introduce the key actors with responsibility in the area of Aide Publique au 
Développement (APD), followed by a summary of the respective policy priorities. 
Finally, we provide an overview of the French aid allocation. 
2.1  Actors 
France has adopted an organizational structure for managing aid in which the 
responsibilities for policy formulation and aid implementation are separated (Figure 
4). Most other DAC donors, including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United States follow this model (OECD 2009: 35).   
 
Figure 4: A functional representation of the main actors in French APD 
 
Source: adopted from MAEDI 2014 
 
The main actors in the French aid architecture are the Directorate-General for 
International Co-operation and Development (DGM) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and International Development (MAEDI), the Treasury in the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Finance and Industry (MFCP), and the French Development Agency (AFD).  
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These institutions provide the bulk of all French aid. Smaller fractions of the French 
aid budget come from other ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development, and the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Research). The MAEDI also hosts the Crisis Center (CDC) that allows 
France to quickly react to humanitarian catastrophes, France has also established a 
thematic inter-departmental working group to promote disaster prevention, mitigation 
and early warning approaches in development programs (OECD 2009: 103). 
Over the last two decades, France made two important institutional changes in the 
organizational structure of its aid. The first concerns the establishment of the Inter-
Ministerial Committee for International Co-operation and Development (CICID) in 
1998. Chaired by the Prime Minister, its members include the 12 ministers who have 
responsibilities in the development co-operation program. The key goal of the CICID 
is to improve inter-ministerial coordination. The CICID specifically aims to 
 specify the countries of the “French Priority Zone” (ZSP) benefitting from a 
special partnership with France; 
 set guidelines for the objectives and instruments of international co-operation 
and development policy;  
 ensure geographic and sectorial coherence among the different components 
and institutions of French co-operation; and  
 monitor and evaluate aid primarily according to aid effectiveness targets 
(Euroresources 2012).  
CICID meets at least once a year and may meet at official or senior official levels in 
between high-level meetings. The MAEDI and the Ministry of Finance build the co-
secretariat for the committee (OECD 2009: 18). While the specific institutional design 
of the CICID is unique, other DAC donors such as Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and the United States have similar policy coordination committees.  
The second reform concerns the creation of the DGM within the MAEDI. DGM was 
established in March 2009 in order to “ensure a more strategic approach in its 
relationship with developing countries” and to “facilitate partnerships between the 
MAEDI and civil society” (OECD 2009: 18). This institutional reform may have been 
initiated by the DAC peer review (OECD 2013) which attested France a rather weak 
engagement with civil society both in the formulation of its national aid policies and in 
the implementation of its development program (MAEDI 2014: 103). 
To implement its bilateral program, France primarily relies on Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD). AFD is the pivotal actor for bilateral assistance in sectors 
associated with the Millennium Development Goals and for implementing global 
budgetary assistance. AFD reports to both MFCP and MAEDI. 
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Program implementation also involves French representation in the partner countries 
through diplomatic offices, co-operation and cultural action services, and research 
centers (MAEDI 2014: 120). Compared to the DAC average, France can be 
considered a relatively decentralized donor. About 55% of its development staff are 
located in the field (OECD 2009: 40). Only the European Commission or Denmark 
have similarly high shares of field staff.  
The main instrument for programming assistance to the ZSP priority countries is the 
Partnership Framework Document (DCP). The framework presents the indicative 
financing envelope for French support, by sector of intervention, and spells out 
agreed activities over a five-year period. The frameworks are negotiated with the 
partner countries and confirmed in the “Strategic Orientation and Programming 
Conference”. The DCP is the key tool of the French Action Plan for aid effectiveness 
(OECD 2009: 132). 
2.2  Policies 
France recognizes that development co-operation is an important instrument of 
foreign policy – as do half of all DAC members. Explicit policy statements along these 
lines can be found for example for Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United 
States (OECD 2009: 17). 
The last two years witnessed important steps toward the renovation of French aid at 
the policy level: the "development congregations" (during November 2012 and March 
2013), the reunion of the CICID (July 2013), and the adoption of the first law on the 
strategic direction for development aid and international solidarity (so-called LOPDSI, 
July 2014).  
As the result of this process, France today prioritizes the fight against poverty and the 
achievement of sustainable development in its economic, social, and environmental 
dimension. In particular, France and its partners seek to respond to four 
complementary challenges, including   
 promotion of peace, stability, human rights, and gender equality; 
 equity, social justice, and human development; 
 sustainable economic development and employment generation; and 
 preservation of the environment and global public goods (MAEDI 2014: 8). 
In pursuing these substantive development priorities, French aid rests upon four 
overarching principles: transparency, coherence, concerted action with civil society, 
and efficiency (MAEDI 2014: 8). 
These policy priorities and guiding principles build upon the traditional objectives of 
French aid, which have included poverty reduction and access to global public goods 
as epitomized in the Millennium Development Goals.  
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The CICID identified five priority sectors in the Millennium Development Goals 
(Euroresources 2012): Health; Education and Vocational Training; Agriculture; Food 
Security; Sustainable Development and Climate; and Global Growth. The “Biannual 
Report 2014” of the MAEDI enlists three sector priorities that are being addressed 
particularly through French support of global funds, namely education, environment, 
and health. 
France has also sought to help emerging countries in their transition by supporting 
their economic and human development and to respond to crisis situations as 
effectively as possible (OECD 2009: 131). France has championed the idea of 
“differentiated partnerships” with its beneficiary countries. This approach implies 
adapting aid instruments to respond to the specific needs of beneficiaries. These 
differentiated partnerships extend to four groups of countries (MAEDI 2014: 50): 
 Priority poor countries: Assistance to these countries will mainly take the form 
of concessional loans and grants; 
 Intermediate countries maintaining privileged relations with France: Assistance 
to these countries takes the form of concessional loans and technical 
assistance; 
 Emerging Countries: French aid to these countries will take the form of highly 
concessional loans and grants for the support of governance; 
 (Post-)crisis countries: These countries also receive special grants and 
humanitarian funds. 
2.3  Aid channels and aid allocation 
In terms of its overall aid as a share of Gross National Income (aid/GNI), France 
exceeds the aid effort of most other DAC donors. While exceeding the average share 
of aid to GNI in the EU in the 1990s, France has been more or less matching the EU 
average since the 2000s (Figure 5). France reached the EU target of 0.51% in 2010, 
but aid effort declined thereafter. In 2013, France provided 0.41% of its GNI for APD. 
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Figure 5: ODA/GNI in comparative perspective. 
 
Source: DAC1 (OECD 2015) 
 
Bilateral aid 
As a donor with a long tradition of development assistance, France provides APD to 
more than 170 countries and territories (Figure 6). French aid also has a 
comparatively strong regional focus on Africa, which received 60% of French bilateral 
aid. Moreover, 12 of the 20 top recipients in 2013 were situated in Africa (Table 1). 
 
Figure 6:  Beneficiaries in 2013 based on French bilateral and multi-bi aid 
disbursement data 
 
Source: EU Donor Atlas 
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Table 1: Top 20 recipients of APD disbursements in 2013 
 Country USD million 
1 Morocco 878.37 
2 Myanmar 592.26 
3 South Africa 391.93 
4 Mexico 319.85 
5 Kenya 261.01 
6 China 257.07 
7 Vietnam 251.29 
8 Côte d’Ivoire 245.66 
9 Colombia 219.59 
10 Senegal 212.89 
11 Turkey 193.93 
12 Cameroon 187.22 
13 Tunisia 171.54 
14 Guinea 158.18 
15 Brazil 151.01 
16 Algeria 149.96 
17 India 139.54 
18 Nigeria 119.98 
19 Ghana 115.29 
20 Mali 114.05 
Source: EU Donor Atlas 2015 
 
In terms of aid sectors, France channeled about USD 1.5 billion to education, 
followed by multi-sector aid (USD 1.4 billion), transport (USD 770 million) in 2013. It 
also provided USD 1.2 billion in debt relief. These sectors together accounted for 
more than a third of all French bilateral aid (see Appendix, Figure A-3). It thus seems 
that French bilateral aid allocation is only weakly related to its sector priorities spelled 
out by the CICID in 2009. 
 
Multilateral aid 
France considers multilateral agencies an important lever to respond to development 
challenges. When including pass-through multilaterals as multilateral contributions, 
almost 90% of its multilateral aid is channeled to just eight multilateral institutions. 
The top five multilateral organizations in the French portfolio when excluding the 
pass-through mechanisms are (MAEDI 2014: 74): 
 European Union: France is the second largest contributor to the European 
Development Fund (EDF), a voluntary fund dedicated to the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific developing countries, and the European Community 
budget (EUR 1.6 billion in 2012); 
 World Bank: In 2012, France was the fifth largest contributor to the 
International Development Association (IDA), the soft-lending branch of the 
World Bank (EUR 446 million in 2012);   
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 United Nations entities: Cumulative contributions reached EUR 163 million in 
2012 (thereof about EUR 40 million in core voluntary contributions); the four 
most important agencies are UNDP, UNHCR, UNRWA, and UNICEF, which 
together accounted for about 80% of French voluntary contributions to the UN 
system; 
 African Development Bank (EUR 161 million in 2012); 
 International Monetary Fund (EUR 68 million in 2012); 
In its Law on the Strategic Direction for Development Aid and International Solidarity 
(July 2014), France recognizes its commitment to strengthen the complementarity 
between its bilateral channels and its multilateral development policy. In order to 
reduce fragmentation, the CICID also decided to develop a multilateral strategy 
including the United Nations, the European Union, and the Bretton Woods institutions 
(MAEDI 2014). 
 
3.  A comparative perspective on French multi-bi aid  
Multi-bi aid refers to earmarked contributions to international development 
organizations. It must be distinguished from both mandatory contributions and 
unearmarked voluntary contributions, which jointly form the core contributions 
available to these organizations. The multilateral’s governing body decides over the 
allocation of these pooled funds.  
Multi-bi aid has risen tremendously over the last two decades. According to our multi-
bi aid dataset, multi-bi aid reached almost USD 18 billion in 2012, up from only USD 
3 billion in 2000. This expansion is also reflected in the growth of trust funds housed 
at international development organizations. For example, the World Bank alone 
manages about 700 different trust fund programs, and presumably more funds and 
similar instruments exist across the United Nations system.  
A parallel trend is the proliferation of new multilateral institutions with narrow 
mandates since the late 1990s. These so-called pass-through multilaterals, global or 
vertical funds mobilize funds for specific issues from a range of donors including 
private actors, while using the financial infrastructure, and, by and large, the 
implementing capacities of the established international development organizations. 
Therefore, pass-through multilaterals are an important source of multi-bi funding from 
the perspective of multilateral organizations besides the multi-bi funding extended by 
DAC donor countries.  
In the case of France, the pro-rata multi-bi aid from pass-through multilaterals in 
which France is a member exceeds the multi-bi aid that France channels directly to 
international development organizations (Figure 7). This is hardly a surprise given the 
strong French support to global funds. 
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Figure 7: The French use of aid channels 1990-2012 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
France uses different channels as compared to other EU members as well as other 
DAC donors. Figure 8 illustrates this by summing each of the four aid channels over 
the most recent seven-year period. Whereas total French multi-bi aid accounts for a 
maximum of 5% of the French aid envelope, this corresponding share amounts to 
almost 15% for EU members and about 12% for DAC donors. Furthermore, France 
holds an intermediary position as regards its use of the bilateral channel, being 
somewhat closer to the DAC average of 66% than the EU average at 54%. 
Figure 8: Use of aid channels by France and different donor groups (2006-2012)  
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
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3.1  French activities in pass-through multilaterals, global or vertical funds 
Pass-through multilaterals, global or vertical funds are important channels for fulfilling 
French sector priorities. The MAEDI report stresses their benefits in terms of donor 
coordination. However, a systematic meta-study of the available evidence on the 
alignment of multi-donor trust funds with the principles of the Paris Declaration has 
found increased ownership in most cases but ambiguous results with regard to 
harmonization and managing for results (Barakat et al. 2012). The MAEDI report also 
argues that the massive proliferation of specialized multilateral institutions provides 
an opportunity to develop specific expertise, suggesting that this specific expertise 
lies at the core of the apparent success of these institutions in delivering tangible 
results (MAEDI 2014: 74). However, the report also acknowledges that these new 
multilaterals may potentially undermine the coherence of the multilateral system. 
Through its active support of global funds, France complements its bilateral priorities 
in three priority sectors (MAEDI 2014: 74).  
In the area of education, France is an active supporter of the Global Partnership on 
Education (GPE), having contributed EUR 47.5 million over the period 2011-13. 
France shapes the policy framework of GPE through its representation in the 
governing council and several technical committees (MAEDI 2014: 84). Furthermore, 
France has sent two national experts to the GPE Secretariat. 
In the area of the environment, France contributes to the fight against climate 
change through its participation in the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Clean 
Technology Fund (CTF), the Montreal Protocol Fund, and the incipient Green 
Climate Fund (GCF). In the GEF, France contributed almost USD 300 million in the 
5th replenishment in 2009 (equivalent to 8.4% of the total replenishment). In the CTF, 
which is the larger window of the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), France donated 
USD 266 million since 2011. The CTF is the “most advanced in implementation of its 
program” (ICF 2014: X) as compared to the other initiatives under the CIFs. In the 
Montreal Protocol Fund, France contributed about USD 236 million since inception. 
In the GCF, France has engaged with USD 1.6 million in total. 
In the area of health, a key sectoral priority, France supports all major sectoral pass-
through multilaterals. It is the second largest contributor to Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) (with USD 300 million per year) and has 
committed half of all resources of UNITAID (USD 149 million per year).8 France also 
is the second largest donor to the GAVI Alliance (EUR 27 million in 2012). 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
  In 2014, France cut its disbursement by EUR 25 million, provoking calls to stay put with its 
commitment. 
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It also allocated EUR 1.3 billion in guarantees until 2026 for the International 
Financial Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), an innovative finance vehicle that aims to 
reduce the costs of vaccinations. The financing scheme was co-founded with the 
United Kingdom and is supported by Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom; South Africa also joined recently 
(http://www.iffim.org/donors). Most French contributions to global health initiatives are 
funded through innovative financing mechanisms, including taxes on air flights and, 
since 2012, on financial transactions (Tobin tax) (MAEDI 2014: 85). 
Through its support to global funds, France contributes to the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In terms of cumulative volumes, the three 
most important pass-through multilaterals are GFATM, GEF, and IFFIm (Table A-4, 
see Appendix). Beyond financial clout, France influences policy in these international 
fora. In particular, France holds its own seat in the governing bodies of CTF, GFATM 
and UNITAID (where it also is a founding member), and it twice held the (rotating) 
chair of the relevant constituency in the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). In the GEF, France shares its seat in the governing 
board with Germany and the United Kingdom. 
3.2  French participation in trust funds at international development organizations 
In the following, we study the French engagement in the trust funds hosted by 
international development organizations. We take the bilateral donor perspective by 
considering multi-bi aid in the narrow sense of the term, which means excluding the 
aid provided from global funds.  
We compare French multi-bi aid to its own bilateral aid, and to the multi-bi aid of both 
EU members and DAC members. First, we seek to assess whether multi-bi 
cooperation is complementary to bilateral aid and whether it is consistent with overall 
French aid policy goals. Our inter-donor analysis juxtaposes France with the 13 other 
EU member countries and the 22 other DAC member countries9. 
Use of different aid channels 
France has used multi-bi aid to a lesser extent than the average DAC donor (Figure 
9). Its share of multi-bi aid in terms of the classic bilateral aid never exceeds 5%. This 
contrasts with the much greater use of multi-bi aid by the average EU member 
(peaking at almost 25%) as well as other DAC donors (reaching almost 20%). These 
other donors use multi-bi aid up to four times more frequently than France. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Data for these 22 DAC donors are available for the full time period in the Creditor Reporting System. 
These donors are AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHE, DNK, DEU, ESP, FIN, GBR, GRC, ITA, ISL, JPN, 
KOR, LUX, NED, NOR, NZL, PRT, SWE, USA. 
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Figure 9: Multi-bi aid as of bilateral aid 
 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
While other donors have significantly expanded their multi-bi cooperation since the 
turn of the millennium, France started using trust funds around 2007. In the most 
recent years, data suggests a decline in French multi-bi aid. 
Geographic priorities 
Figure 10 shows the geographic allocation of French multi-bi and bilateral aid and the 
multi-bi aid allocation by other donor groups. Compared to the French bilateral aid 
portfolio, its multi-bi aid appears more strongly focused on Sub-Sahara Africa, the 
most important target region, and on global activities. Consequently, other regions 
are less important than in the bilateral aid program. In comparison to other donor 
groups, France provides more multi-bi to Africa, consistent with its stated aim to 
make Africa a priority region of assistance. Along with its support for global activities 
and the North African region, support to sub-Saharan Africa significantly exceeds the 
EU average and the DAC average. Hence, America and notably Asia are 
underrepresented in the French multi-bi aid program. 
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Figure 10: Geographic allocation of multi-bi aid and bilateral aid by France, DAC and 
EU donors (2006-2012)  
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
A more fine-grained analysis goes beyond regional aggregates and considers the 
individual recipient countries of French aid. In terms of disbursements in 2013, the 
top ten beneficiaries of French bilateral and multi-bi cooperation were Morocco (USD 
878 million), Myanmar (USD 592 million), South Africa (USD 392 million), Mexico 
(USD 320 million), Kenya (USD 261 million), China (USD 257 million), Vietnam (USD 
251 million), Côte d’Ivoire (USD 246 million), Colombia (USD 220 million), and 
Senegal (USD 212 million) (Euroresources 2012). 
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Figure 11: Country allocation of French bilateral aid (2006-2012)  
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
The top bilateral recipients are similar even when the analysis is based on the 2006-
2012 period instead of just the year 2013. For example, Morocco remains by far the 
most important beneficiary, followed by Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria (Figure 11). The 
bulk of multi-bi funding over the 2006-2012 period went to Cameroon (almost USD 
600 million), exceeding by far transfers to  major recipient countries such as Ukraine, 
the Palestine territories, Madagascar, and Ghana, all of which received less than 
USD 80 million in the six-year period (Figure 12). 
There are no countries that benefit from multi-bi aid but are not bilateral recipients of 
French aid. It is far more often the case than not that French bilateral aid exceeds 
multi-bi aid. In a few countries, France committed a relatively high share of its aid as 
multi-bi aid in 2006-2012 – including Ukraine (60%), South Sudan (56%), and 
Cameroon (28%).  
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Figure 12: Country allocation of French multi-bi aid  
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
Our analysis hence detects two noteworthy features of the geographic allocation of 
French multi-bi aid. First, multi-bi aid is geographically more focused than bilateral 
aid. In particular, the African continent and regional activities receive a relatively 
higher share than in bilateral aid. Second, French multi-bi aid is concentrated on few 
countries and allocated more unequally. Figure 13 arranges the bilateral and multi-bi 
recipients by their aid volumes. Multi-bi aid declines more rapidly and supports fewer 
recipients than bilateral aid.   
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Figure 13: Distribution of aid amounts across recipients by funding type 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
Sector priorities 
According to the multi-bi aid dataset of Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2015), the sector 
distribution of the multi-bi aid portfolios of France and all other donors are strikingly 
different. First, France uses multi-bi aid comparatively less to target its humanitarian 
aid than the average DAC donor. While France channels 11% of its multi-bi aid for 
humanitarian purposes, the respective figure reaches 18% for EU donors and almost 
28% for the average DAC donor. This difference may be due to France’s own local 
presence and bilateral capacities to respond to humanitarian crisis.  
France allocates a larger fraction of its multi-bi aid to commodity assistance and debt 
relief rather than productive sectors and multi-sector aid. French multi-bi aid and 
bilateral aid is allocated similarly across sectors. A higher share of multi-bi aid is 
spent in the social sector and for commodity assistance, at the expense of economic 
infrastructure, productive sectors, and multi-sector aid (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Sector allocation (2006-2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
Use of multilateral organizations 
Donors choose to which multilateral organizations to contribute how much and 
whether the financing is provided as earmarked or unearmarked. The French choice 
of international development organizations for the implementation of its multi-bi aid is 
fairly similar to other donors (Figure 15). France cooperates less frequently with the 
United Nations and the World Bank than DAC and EU donors on average. However, 
it uses regional development banks to a similar extent as the other EU members and 
more frequently than DAC donors. Moreover, France provides a  higher share of 
multi-bi aid to the EU institutions and other multilateral organizations. The high 
volume for “other multilateral organizations” mainly accrues to UNITAID (which at the 
same time is a global fund). Smaller volumes are channeled to the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa, the Special Fund for Climate and 
Environment Protection of the Central European Initiative, and the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature.  France appears to use multi-bi aid to 
complement its core contributions (Figure 15). While most of its multilateral aid is 
dedicated to the EU, notably the EDF (in which it is the second largest donor), 
France does not channel a similarly high share of multi-bi aid through the EU. France 
privileges the United Nations for its multi-bi aid. The MAEDI’s “Biannual Report 2014” 
establishes that for the year 2013, core contributions to the United Nations for 
development purposes reached USD 190 million (thereof USD 47 million as voluntary 
contributions), as opposed to USD 51 million in non-core contributions (MAEDI 2014: 
83).  
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Figure 15: Use of multilateral organizations for multi-bi and multilateral aid (2006-
2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
Earmarking patterns 
While all multi-bi aid is earmarked, the restrictions to its use range from broad 
geographic earmarks to project-specific financing. Figure 16 shows that France 
imposes fewer restrictions on the aid sector than both the average DAC donor and 
also the average EU donor. However, a very high share of French multi-bi has a 
geographic earmark. More than 80% of its multi-bi aid is earmarked for a specific 
country, as opposed to only 50% for EU donors and 60% for DAC donors. Finally, 
France only seldom restricts its multi-bi support to specific departments within 
multilateral organizations or seconds own staff to multilateral organizations in its 
multi-bi aid cooperation as do other donors. The example of the GPE, in which 
France sent two experts to the Secretariat, seems to be a true exception. 
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Figure 16: Earmarking patterns (2006-2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
Figure 17 shows the average earmarking depth index in multi-bi aid for France and 
the other donors over the period 2000-2012.10 While French aid was more heavily 
earmarked in the early years of the millennium, France has been more lenient than 
the average donor since 2003. There are some signs that the difference in 
earmarking depth however has recently started closing again. 
                                                          
10
 To construct the earmarking index, we simply built the sum of all earmarking dimensions, whereby 
in each dimension, a soft earmark counts as one index point, and a tight earmark counts as two index 
points. The index theoretically ranges from 0 to 6 (see also, Michaelowa, Reinsberg, and Schneider, 
2014).) 
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Figure 17: Earmarking depth over time (2000-2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
Findings are similar when earmarking is considered separately for different 
multilateral organizations (Figure 18). French earmarking depth is similar to that of 
the average donor when dealing with the EU institutions and the group of other 
multilaterals. France cedes more autonomy in multi-bi aid than other donors to the 
United Nations, the Regional Development Banks, and particularly the World Bank. 
The low earmarking of French multi-bi aid could indicate that France carefully 
chooses its multi-bi cooperation partners so that there is no need for further 
earmarking. France mainly supports established trust-funded programs at multilateral 
organizations with broad scope. 
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Figure 18: Earmarking depth across selected multilateral organizations (2006-2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
 
The strong French preference for multi-donor trust funds over single-donor trust 
funds as compared to the average DAC donor lends further support to this 
interpretation (Figure 19). While France channels more than 65% of its multi-bi aid to 
global funds and trust funds hosted at international development organizations, the 
average DAC donor channels only 20% through such mechanisms. EU members 
seem to be closer to the DAC average in this regard, channeling 30% through multi-
donor trust funds. 
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Figure 19: Type of trust funds at international development organizations (2006-
2012) 
 
Source: Multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015) 
Institution-specific analysis at the World Bank 
A complementary analysis of World Bank data suggests that France uses multi-bi aid 
in a way that is complementary to its other flows of aid.11 The few trust funds with 
French support at the World Bank include regional programs and country-specific 
humanitarian funds and sector initiatives. The funds that have received  cumulative 
French contributions above USD 10 million since inception include the free-standing 
trust funds with the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) vice presidency at the World 
Bank, consultant trust funds, Haiti Reconstruction Trust Fund (HRTF), Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (most 
notably the Readiness Fund), IFC Technical Assistance trust funds, and the West 
Bank and Gaza Trust Fund (Table A-5, see Appendix). All of these funds are multi-
donor initiatives. 
Some trust funds (though not the largest ones), are supported by more than one 
French aid institution. A prime example is the Lebanon and Syria Crisis Trust Fund 
(LSCTF), supported by all three major French aid players. Similar triple overlaps are 
observable for the Marseille Center for the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest 
(CGAP), the Mediterranean Integration program (MCMI), or the Sub-Saharan Africa 
Transport Policy Program (SSATP), despite rather small overall contributions.  
                                                          
11
 The World Bank data is the most comprehensive available data on donor funding of 
individual trust funds and most pass-through multilaterals. 
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For a number of further funds, at least two of the key aid institutions are donors. This 
pattern of multiple French funding sources for the same multilateral institution may 
indicate that France currently does not yet coordinate its multi-bi aid across agencies, 
suggesting a need for an overarching trust fund engagement policy. This hints at 
some potential for enhanced organizational efficiency among French aid institutions. 
While there may be reasons for separate French contributors, it would generally be 
advisable for coherence and avoidance of duplication that France develops a division 
of labor in managing its trust funds at the Bank.  
Another striking feature of the French engagement is that at the exception of a few 
single-donor initiatives, France mostly supports well-established multi-donor trust 
funds that finance established programs inside the World Bank. France does not 
seem to wish to maneuver the Bank into unchartered territory, as opposed to some 
other donors (IEG 2011). This is laudable given the controversy around “advocacy 
trust funds” inside the World Bank (Reinsberg 2015), and the evidence that single-
donor trust funds increase fragmentation while multi-donor trust funds have improved 
donor coordination at least in some cases (Barakat et al. 2012). 
 
4.  The determinants of French multi-bi aid  
The above analysis suggests that France follows a different approach than its peers 
in the use of multi-bi aid. On the one hand, France lies above the DAC average in 
terms of its funding of pass-through multilaterals. On the other hand, France 
contributes lower volumes and shares of bilateral aid to trust funds at international 
development organizations than its peers. In these contexts, France primarily 
engages in multi-donor trust funds supporting long-standing programs. 
What are the reasons for this characteristic pattern? This section explores the 
potential determinants of French multi-bi aid patterns by first drawing on anecdotal 
evidence. Subsequently, it summarizes in a more systematic manner the potential 
determinants of multi-bi aid based on the literature and anecdotal evidence from 
other DAC donors. Finally, this section proceeds with an empirical systematic 
analysis of these potential determinants, using Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) on 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, and Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) in order to compare the determinants of different types of aid. 
4.1  Anecdotal evidence about French engagement in global funds 
Why does France so much engage in global funds? The MAEDI report highlights a 
few reasons underlying this policy. Most importantly, pass-through multilaterals are 
powerful institutions to pool funds of multiple donors while specifying in advance a 
narrow policy goal. Moreover, their areas of intervention, health, education and 
environment, closely align with French priorities, also with respect to geographic 
allocation (MAEDI 2014: 88).  
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France considers that the global funds are particularly well positioned to assist crisis 
countries and fragile states, in which a stronger coordination of aid between donors 
tends to have the strongest benefits for aid effectiveness (see also OECD 2015). 
When considering the four groups of priority countries targeted by French aid, global 
funds seem to help France address its weak bilateral presence in fragile states, post-
crisis situations, and poor countries. French bilateral aid is particularly strong in 
middle-income countries and transition economies. 
Why does France – contrary to its engagement in global funds – rarely use multi-bi 
aid on its own? Again, the MAEDI report provides some insight by discussing the 
French engagement with the United Nations entities. Earmarked contributions are 
primarily used to finance French expertise inside the United Nations and the 
implementation of French priority actions in regions that the bilateral channel is 
unable to reach. These priority sectors are maternal health and child survival (MAEDI 
2014: 84).  
Informal communication with French aid officials suggests yet another reason for 
using multi-bi aid. For both small trust funds and bigger trust funds alike, the “need to 
spend money rapidly” can be a motivation to channel aid through trust funds. Trust 
funds allow disbursing funds that cannot be carried over to the next budget year. In 
addition, funds delegated to multilaterals (as well as multilateral aid) can be counted 
immediately and in full as Official Development Assistance in the year of contribution, 
even though project disbursements may occur later, sometimes substantively 
according to information from World Bank staff. 
4.2  Hypotheses about the determinants of multi-bi aid 
This section proposes sixteen testable hypotheses about the factors influencing the 
amount of multi-bi aid, drawing from the explanations suggested in the academic 
literature and policy reports (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015). The four 
sets of tentative explanations are related to international politics, domestic politics in 
the donor country, donor’s aid preferences and the donor’s aid management. Table 
A-6 (see Appendix) provides an overview over all hypotheses and Table A-7 (see 
Appendix) includes detailed information on how the variables were constructed. At 
the end of the section, the control variables are described. 
International Politics 
H1. Multi-bi aid relates positively to a donor’s international engagement. 
The international engagement of donors might be related to geopolitical ambitions, 
altruistic motives, and economic and political interests. While multilateral 
organizations are important fora to act upon these motives, donors also use bilateral 
diplomacy to diffuse their policies. Countries’ participation in international relations 
can be measured using the “political globalization” sub-index within the KOF Index of 
Globalization. It combines information on the extent of membership in international 
organizations and UN peace missions, the number of embassies and high 
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commissions in a country, and the numbers of treaties signed (Dreher 2006, 2009). 
Membership in international organizations is a condition for contributing multi-bi aid to 
these organizations. Unsurprisingly, Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2012) found 
the KOF index to influence multilateral aid budgets. As a second and more direct 
measure of a donor’s multilateral activity, we take the share of multilateral aid in the 
total aid budget. 
H2. Multi-bi aid is positively related to having hosted a G8 summit recently. 
G8 countries rotate in hosting this summit that allows head of governments to 
discuss current challenges. Host countries undertake considerable efforts to assure 
that the summit is a success and often seek to demonstrate action on emerging 
challenges. One way of demonstrating action is to set up an international fund for a 
topic featuring high on the international agenda. Host countries of the high-level 
meetings are thus likely to contribute considerable amounts to such a fund in the 
year following the summit. We use the variable of Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 
(2015). 
H3. Donors increase multi-bi aid if their preferences are not well aligned with 
multilateral aid. 
The rise of multi-bi aid with characteristics of bilateral and multilateral aid has been 
linked to donor’s perception about the alignment of the multilateral activities with 
donor’s preferences (Eichenauer and Hug 2014, OECD 2015). Donors with 
preferences diverging from the collective preferences that result from multilateral 
negotiations might use multi-bi aid as a substitute for multilateral core aid. We use 
the measure of collective distance to IDA proposed by Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and 
Knack (2015). This measure is based on the sum of squared distances between the 
sector shares of the IDA portfolio and the bilateral aid portfolio of a donor.  
H4. EU membership is negatively related with multi-bi aid. 
Member states of the European Union are required to support the development 
efforts of the European Commission. This ‘EU aid’ may be considered multilateral aid 
by member states and thus crowd out earmarked (and unearmarked) contributions to 
multilateral agencies (e.g. if member states have a more or less fixed multilateral aid 
budget) (Addison, McGillivray, and Odedokun 2004). We test this by adding a 
dummy variable for EU membership and interpret a negative coefficient as evidence 
for partial or full crowding-out. 
H5. A donor’s multi-bi aid effort has a positive relationship with the multi-bi effort of 
donor peers. 
Insofar that foreign aid is an international public good, the total aid effort is lower than 
optimal because of collective action problems. Donors are thus likely to closely watch 
potential free-riding of their peers. While free-riding arguably is a larger problem for 
multilateral aid than for other aid channels, multi-bi aid efforts may increase as a 
consequence of ‘social’ pressure from other governments and civil society demands 
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made through the media. For this reason, we expect a positive peer effect on a 
donor’s multi-bi aid budget. For any given donor, multi-bi effort by peers is measured 
by the lagged and logged amount of multi-bi aid committed by all other donors.  
Domestic Politics 
H6. Multi-bi aid budgets are higher for left-wing governments. 
It is straightforward to expect multi-bi aid budgets to be associated with spending on 
aid generally but also other government expenses so that the budget literature is 
relevant. The ideology of government has been shown to influence the degree of 
social spending and redistribution domestically (Potrafke 2009, 2011). Moreover, left-
wing governments are more convinced of state capacity and the benefits of 
government intervention and thus likely to support higher public aid budgets while 
right-wing governments might encourage private charity. While Fuchs, Dreher, and 
Nunnenkamp (2014) find no evidence that ideology influences the size of the overall, 
multilateral, and bilateral aid budgets, Brech and Potrafke (2013) provide evidence 
that ideology influences the type of foreign aid. Following the lines of the literature 
(see also Milner and Tingley 2013 for the United States), we therefore expect that 
party preferences over aid allocation channels differ. We compute political ideology 
as the seat-weighted average of individual ideological positions of cabinet parties. 
We obtain information on individual parties from the ParlGov database (Manow and 
Döring 2012). This proxy variable has the advantage that it allows measuring political 
ideology for coalition governments, the prevalent type of government among the 
OECD/DAC donor countries in our sample.  
H7. The size of the multi-bi aid budget is positively related to interest divergence in 
government. 
This hypothesis is also related to the general budget literature that finds budget 
deficits to be larger for countries with several parties in the ruling coalition (see also 
Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de Haan 2001). Round and Odedokun 
(2004) argue that this arguments also applies to the aid budget because more varied 
interests need to be satisfied by the budget. Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2014) 
find no evidence that government fractionalization affects the size of the total aid 
budget. However, multi-bi aid is distinct from multilateral and bilateral aid. Unlike 
these aid channels, multi-bi aid is not pre-committed to cover membership fees in 
international organizations or employ national development staff and can thus be 
changed relatively easily during a legislature. In addition, our interviews with aid 
officials and the OECD/DAC’s donor survey suggest that the competency to allocate 
multi-bi aid often lies in the hands of line ministries with distinct sectoral expertise 
(OECD 2011). For example, the Ministry for Energy or the Ministry for the Economy 
may manage payments to an energy trust fund at the World Bank rather than the 
Foreign Affairs office or the Development Ministry. We thus expect multi-bi aid to be 
particularly attractive in situations of preference diversity inside the government. We 
use the maximum ideological distance in political ideology among all cabinet parties 
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as proxy for such diversity, drawing on the ParlGov database (Manow and Döring 
2012).  
H8. An incoming development minister is associated with a reduction in multi-bi aid in 
the first year in office. 
Political leaders have been shown to matter for many outcomes (e.g., Jones and 
Olken 2005) including the type of development aid provided to recipient countries 
(Fuchs and Richert 2015). We expect an incoming development minister seeks to 
profile herself just as a new head of government and her administration do in their 
first hundred and more days in office. To show her preferences and priorities, 
bilateral aid seems the most direct way for a newly appointed minister, in particular 
because the budget is likely to have been fixed in the previous year. A reshuffling of 
the budget from multi-bi to bilateral aid the most likely strategy because multilateral 
aid is based on long term commitments, based on burden sharing principles and peer 
pressure, or represents membership fees. In contrast, multi-bi aid can be reduced in 
a flexible manner based on donor preferences. Our development minister indicator 
variable is one in those years in which the development minister changes according 
to the data from Fuchs and Richert (2015). We lag the dummy by one year to 
account for the fact that a development minister may be incoming at any time of the 
year, including the end of the calendar year and that her policy changes result in 
changing disbursement patterns after several months only. 
H9. Multi-bi aid is positively related to donor transparency. 
Multi-bi aid is delegated to multilateral organizations for implementation. While 
donors keep some control over the allocation of these contributions through the 
earmarking, the micromanagement of aid delivery is not possible. Therefore, donor 
governments that are more corrupt in the delivery of their domestic public services 
may prefer to use bilateral aid that allows for full discretion with respect to the timing 
and delivery of aid in the recipient country. This argument does not extend to 
multilateral aid directly because a corrupt donor government might nevertheless 
provide some multilateral aid to satisfy her membership requirements in international 
organizations with membership being explained by (geo-)political considerations. We 
thus expect that corrupt governments, all else equal, provide less multi-bi aid and 
measure donor transparency alternatively by the perceived corruption measure of 
Transparency International and the World Bank’s Governance Indicator for Control of 
Corruption (see variable description in the Appendix). 
Donor preferences 
H10. Multi-bi aid is negatively associated with the importance of political motives in 
bilateral aid provision. 
The aid allocation literature has shown that former colonies and politically aligned 
countries receive more aid from former colonizers than equally poor countries (e.g., 
Alesina and Dollar 2000). For donor countries that allocate their bilateral aid 
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according to political motives, we expect the multi-bi aid budget to be lower. We 
measure the importance of political motives for a donor government by the partial R-
squared of a donor-year-specific auxiliary allocation regression of the natural 
logarithm of bilateral aid on recipient need and donor self-interest variables. 
Specifically, our measure is the improvement in the adjusted R-squared when the 
(lagged) political and economic interest variables are added to a baseline 
specification (see also Table A-7).12 As economic and political variables we follow the 
relevant literature and use recipient country exports and imports as a share of GDP 
(QoG 2015), colonial heritage, and measure political alignment in the United Nations 
General Assembly with ideal points (Strezhnev and Voeten 2009).  
Bertoli, Cornia, and Manaresi (2008) argue that aid can be considered a substitute 
for a colonial past and thus is higher for those countries that did not have colonies 
previously. They find empirical support for this hypothesis. In their fixed effect 
estimations, Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2014) also find evidence in favor of 
the argument. Instead of using a dummy for colonial heritage, we use the share of 
colonies in all bilateral recipient countries to measure the variation in the extent of 
‘colonial’ aid provision.13 We expect a negative coefficient because long-term 
strategic aid giving is more likely to be undertaken through the bilateral aid channel. 
H11. Altruism in bilateral aid relates positively to multi-bi aid. 
A substantial number of aid scholars consider the allocation of multilateral aid to be 
more need-oriented and less strategic than bilateral aid from large and geopolitically 
influential donors (e.g., Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Powell and Bobba 2006; Headey 
2008; Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Knack, Rogers, and 
Eubank 2011). While economic and political interests influence multilateral aid as 
well (e.g., Kersting and Kilby 2015, Kilby 2009, 2013, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 
2009), the relative importance of need arguably is higher for the multilateral aid 
channel. If aid allocation by multilaterals is indeed more need-oriented in average, 
the preferences of altruistic donor governments are quite well aligned with those of 
multilateral organizations. On the one hand, such preference similarly could increase 
the likelihood of delegation according to principal-agent arguments in the multilateral 
context (e.g., Schneider and Tobin 2013; Milner and Tingley 2013, Eichenauer and 
Hug 2014). On the other hand, altruistic donors might be aware of the (informal) 
influences taken by large shareholders in international organizations (e.g., Kuziemko 
and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009), even through voluntary 
unearmarked contributions (Graham 2015). Through earmarking of (some of) their 
multilateral aid, altruistic donors can assure that their funding is not diverted for 
strategic reasons. We therefore have no clear expectation about the sign of the 
coefficient. We measure the need orientation of a donor government by the relative 
improvement in the adjusted R-squared of a donor-year-specific auxiliary regression 
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 The baseline regression includes population, its square, and the need variables GDP per capita, life 
expectancy at birth, and number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants (both WDI) (QoG 2015). 
13
 To our knowledge, this is the first measure of colonial history of a donor country that varies along 
the time dimension; hence, it does not drop in fixed-effects regressions. 
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of the natural logarithm of bilateral aid on measures of donor self-interest (see H10) 
when augmenting this regression with variables that capture recipient-country need. 
Life expectancy, Gross Domestic Product per capita, and telephone lines (all lagged 
by one period) are chosen on the basis of data availability (see Table A-7).  
Characteristics of aid agencies 
H12. Vested interests in the aid bureaucracy relate negatively to multi-bi aid. 
As with all public and private bureaucracies, aid bureaucracies can be expected to 
develop organizational interests that need not be aligned with the goals of their 
principal, being the donor government or the voters in this case (Vaubel 2006). We 
might thus hypothesize that donor agencies that have provided bilateral aid to a large 
number of recipient countries in the past have a well-developed network of bilateral 
agencies. We might then further expect this agency to defend this network and the 
staff associated with maintaining it and thus provides less multi-bi aid that is 
implemented by multilateral organizations. In contrast, donors with a smaller number 
of bilateral country offices might use multi-bi aid as a substitute for their lack of 
bilateral aid presence. Both arguments lead us to expect that donors with a large 
number of recipient countries provide, ceteris paribus, less multi-bi aid. A second 
potential measure of vested interests is the share of administrative expenses in total 
bilateral aid. The share of in-house costs is rough proxy of the importance of vested 
interests though other interpretations of a high ratio are possible. A high share of 
administrative expenses can be a sign of inefficient management of bilateral aid, 
which ceteris paribus could create public pressure to delegate aid to more efficient 
implementers such as multilateral organizations. An opposing interpretation is that a 
high ratio reflects donor capacity resulting from budget-intensive financial 
investments in research or in the close monitoring of implementation. Due to the 
ambiguous interpretation of the variable and thus the sign of the expected effect, we 
abstain from interpreting the coefficient but consider the ratio a relevant control 
variable for robustness checks.  
H13. Multi-bi aid relates negatively to the number of ministries involved in aid giving. 
In many donor countries, several ministries provide foreign aid. Each of these 
ministries is most concerned for specific sector(s) and wants to achieve its goals and 
development ideas abroad. Moreover, government agencies will consider these 
projects as being administered and implemented best under the auspices of their 
expertise. As each agency will seek to keep control over some of its projects, an 
increase in the number of aid-providing ministries increases the share of aid that is 
provided bilaterally. Moreover, each minister and ministry arguably has to satisfy their 
specific pressure groups, best achieved by keeping responsibility for the entire 
project management process. Decentralized aid giving seems to be an important 
reason for multi-bi aid. The OECD (2011: 18) notes: “when it comes to earmarking 
funds channeled through multilaterals, the responsibility for allocation may lie with an 
entirely different ministry than the one responsible for core (un-earmarked) 
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contributions to that organisation or fund.” Similarly, the development professional 
Owen Barder noted in a hearing at the British House of Commons, that Britain is one 
of the few countries with a single department responsible for foreign aid that is “in a 
position to make those trade-offs [between multilateral, multi-bi and bilateral aid] 
directly” (House of Commons, Answer to Q38). To measure the decentralization of 
aid provision, we use data about the number of agencies within a donor government 
that report Official Development Aid (OECD 2015).  
H14. Independent aid agencies are associated with higher multi-bi aid budgets. 
Aid agencies might be sheltered from the effects of diverging interests in government 
or (temporary) budget cuts through institutional designs that offer some 
independence from the daily political business (Bertoli, Cornia, and Manaresi 2008). 
Bertoli, Cornia, and Manaresi (2008) that independent aid agencies prevent 
temporary reductions in aid during economic downturns but that independence does 
not lead to permanently higher aid budgets. In their fixed effect regressions, Fuchs, 
Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2014) find that the existence of an independent aid 
agency is a (positive) determinant of the ratio of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to GNI. We employ a more fine-grained measure that exploits more of the 
OECD’s (2009) classification of aid agencies into four types.14 Specifically, we add a 
dummy variable for the two more independent aid agency types, treating the other 
two agencies as baseline.  
H15. The ‘quality’ of a donor’s aid relates positively to multi-bi effort. 
The efficiency and effectiveness of multi-bi aid may be higher or lower than 
multilateral or bilateral aid. On the one hand, multi-bi aid is provided through small 
institutional units from which donors demand separate reporting (Reinsberg 2015, 
IEG 2011). This increases transaction costs and thus efficiency is lowered. On the 
other hand, by virtue of limited objectives, trust funds might indeed be more effective 
in addressing those specific challenges. Generally, multi-bi aid can be expected to be 
more need-oriented than bilateral aid, which can more easily be diverted to foster 
political goals because donors are in control of the entire micromanagement process 
(see H8). Therefore, we expect multi-bi aid to be positively related to the quality of 
aid. We follow the definition of QualityODA by Fuchs and Richert (2015) because 
several other comprehensive indices to measure the quality of ODA have not been 
computed prior to 2003 (see, among others, Easterly 2002; Easterly and Pfutze 
2008; Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Knack, Rogers and Eubank 2010; Roodman 2012). 
Fuchs and Richert (2015) use three indicators that are used in those comprehensive 
indices but available for a longer period of time: (i) aid commitments to Least 
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 The OECD distinguishes four models of aid allocation: Model I (“Development co-operation is an 
integral part of the ministry of foreign affairs which is responsible for policy and implementation”), 
model II (“A Development Co-operation Directorate has the lead role within the ministry of foreign 
affairs and is responsible for policy and implementation”), model III (“A ministry has overall 
responsibility for policy and a separate executing agency is responsible for implementation”), model IV 
(“A ministry or agency, which is not the ministry of foreign affairs, is responsible for both policy and 
implementation”).  
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Developed Countries, (ii) its untied ODA commitments, and (iii) its ODA commitments 
to countries with comparatively good governance (all variables are expressed as 
shares of the donor’s bilateral aid budget). We standardize all three variables and 
combine them into an “QualityODA index”.  
H16. Donors with an active multilateral aid policy provide less multi-bi aid. 
Over the last decade, several bilateral donor agencies have assessed multilateral 
agencies with respect to their efficiency, effectiveness, and their relevance for the 
donor’s development objectives. The British aid agency DFID pioneered the 
approach in 2003 (DFID 2005, OECD 2008). The assessment methodology was 
further refined over the last decade while, simultaneously, policy efforts were made to 
coordinate these assessment approaches (OECD n/a).15 The commissioning of an 
evaluation about the performance of multilateral agencies by a donor country can 
either be interpreted as expressing a genuine interest in the working of the 
multilateral system or as a means for a certain government to generate solid 
arguments to withdraw from multilateral cooperation. If the latter interpretation is 
correct, we would expect donors retreating from their international commitments. 
Empirically, donors stress that these assessments primarily serve as reform 
incentives for multilateral agencies and will only have funding consequences if no 
reforms are undertaken. We thus prefer the first interpretation, namely that 
multilateral aid reviews indicate an interest in the improvement of the multilateral 
system. This leads us to expect a negative coefficient on the indicator variable which 
turns and remains one starting in the year the first multilateral aid assessment is 
conducted by the donor country.  
A second measure for a donor’s engagement for multilateral policy is chairmanship of 
relevant working groups at the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack (2015) interpret chairmanship in these working 
groups as a sign of specific interest (and hence specific expertise) in a particular sub-
field of development cooperation, and we follow their interpretation. The oldest 
working groups are the DAC (1960) and the Working Party on Statistics (1969). In 
the mid-1990s, donors became again interested in specific development themes, as 
evidenced by the creation of the working groups on Conflict, Peace, and 
Development (1995), on Poverty Reduction (1998), and Governance (2000). In the 
context of the aid effectiveness debate and the Millennium Development Goals, 
donors further established the working groups on Aid Effectiveness and Donor 
Practices, Development Evaluation, as well as on Gender Equality, and on 
Environment and Development in the early 2000s. Chairmanship is measured by a 
dummy variable for which we expect a negative sign. 
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 This resulted in the creation of the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network 
(MOPAN) with currently has a membership of 19 donor countries. Note that we rely on individual 
review efforts. 
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Control variables 
While we already have an impressive set of variables to test our sixteen hypotheses, 
we control for potential confounders that the literature has identified as most relevant 
to explain the total aid budget and arguably help explaining the size of the multi-bi aid 
envelope. We control for the size of the total aid budget. In robustness analyses, we 
include bilateral and multilateral aid separately. We also include relevant 
determinants that were found robust by Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2014) as 
this is the most recent paper in the aid budget literature and methodologically 
convincing. We posit a positive relationship between multi-bi aid and donor size and 
wealth, respectively. The donor’s size is measured by population and Gross National 
Income (GNI) from the DAC General Statistics (OECD 2014a), where the latter also 
proxies affluence. Economic downturns have also been suggested to affect the aid 
effort (Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2013), and the multi-bi aid budget in particular (see 
Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015) because earmarked aid is more 
easily reduced than other aid types due to its voluntary and delegated nature.16 
Multilateral core aid is mostly based on long-term international commitments while 
reduction of bilateral aid potentially has domestic political costs if, for example, 
domestic employees are laid off. For total aid budgets, Fuchs, Dreher, and 
Nunnenkamp (2014) find no effect of budget constraints or a deterioration of 
domestic macroeconomic conditions controlling for time-invariant donor 
characteristics. Grepin and Sridhar (2012) find that the share of multi-bi aid within 
development assistance for health decreased during the crisis years 2008 and 2009. 
We only control for the percentage change in public debt to avoid inflating the set of 
variables further. Note that a change in debt may grow due to a shrinking economy or 
higher deficits, both of which indicate challenges to the donor’s budget. In robustness 
checks, we further include the fiscal deficit directly, as well as unemployment, and 
inflation. Data comes from the OECD (2014b) and the World Bank (2014) (see Table 
A-7 in the Appendix for a complete variable description). In sum, we control for total 
aid effort, population, GNI, and the percentage change in debt in all regressions and 
add further economic variables in robustness checks.  
Several other variables are included in robustness checks. First, donors often note 
that multi-bi aid requires the political will to delegate aid and the capacity to monitor 
the use of earmarked contributions effectively, both aspects being more likely in more 
experienced aid agencies. However, the relationship could also be the other way 
around. New donors might use multi-bi aid to provide bilateral strategic aid without 
needing to set up their own implementation agency while older donors are more likely 
to already have had an implementing agency before the advent of multi-bi aid (see 
also the hypothesis H11 about the vested interests in aid agencies).  As a proxy for 
experience, we measure donor age by an ordinal variable with three categories. 
Traditional donors, the baseline category in our regressions, established their aid 
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 The OECD also notes the possibility of fluctuating voluntary contributions: “the more DAC members’ 
multilateral portfolios are shaped by non-core resources […] with a limited time horizon, the less 
predictable the overall funding of multilaterals become” (OECD 2010: 14). 
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program between World War II and the mid-1960s. Conversely, what we call 
“traditional latecomers” are countries that became democracies themselves or 
reached a certain level of development to start their own aid program (e.g., Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, or New Zealand). Finally, “new donors” started providing aid after 
1989, notably some Eastern European donors (though many of them are not DAC 
member and thus not in the sample), but also Spain, Portugal, and Korea. Second, 
we control for multilateral replenishments, which might decrease the budget available 
for multi-bi aid. While multilateral commitments are made at the end of the 
replenishment conference, contributions are made in installments until the next 
replenishment conference. Thus, a null effect of having a replenishment conference 
in a given year is possible. The replenishment indicator equals one in years of 
replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA), the African 
Development Fund (AfDF), the Asian Development Fund (AsDF), and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). 
4.3  Descriptive statistical analysis 
We start with some descriptive statistics to probe the plausibility of these explanatory 
factors. In particular, we compare the averages of these variables over the sample 
period of 1990-2012 for France, the average EU member and the average DAC 
donor. Table 2 shows that France is more internationally engaged than the average 
donor because of its strong global presence and diplomatic networks. France also 
extends a higher-than-average share of its aid envelope as multilateral aid. Turning 
to domestic political factors, France is not particularly different from other donors, 
except for a slightly higher frequency of changes in the aid minister. Its aid allocation 
also clearly mirrors its colonial past, given the high number of bilateral recipient 
countries and the high share of colonies among all bilateral recipients. According to 
the aid quality measures of Fuchs and Richert (2015), French aid is of intermediate 
quality, lying above DAC average but below the EU average. This is consistent with 
DAC peer reviews that describe France as “a good donor, which must ensure to 
focus on the poor” (OECD 2013). Consistent with its strong international engagement 
and the fact that the OECD has its headquarters in Paris, France chairs 
disproportionally often a DAC working group. France only recently started to assess 
multilateral organizations.  
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Table 2: Comparative statistics of key explanatory factors (2006-2012)17 
  FRA EU DAC 
H1 International engagement (KOF index) 96.47 88.81 86.00 
H1 Multilateral aid share 38.12 26.69 23.89 
H2 G-8 summit host 0.13 0.03 0.04 
H3 Distance to IDA 4.11 4.53 3.74 
H6 Partisan position 5.66 5.35 5.75 
H7 Ideological distance in the cabinet 1.26 1.65 1.36 
H8 Aid minister change 0.48 0.29 0.35 
H9 Perceived corruption control 7.09 7.57 8.06 
H10 Share of colonies 0.23 0.07 0.01 
H12 Number of recipients 144.3
0 
87.04 107.9
4 
H13 Number of aid ministries 20.00 10.63 9.29 
H15 Aid quality index 0.002 0.21 -0.03 
H16 Chair in DAC working group 0.35 0.20 0.13 
H16 Multilateral assessment 0.04 0.08 0.00 
Cell entries show (unweighted) averages based on the imputed sample.  
 
We looked at the correlation between each variable of interest and French multi-bi 
aid separately. These bivariate correlations suggest three noteworthy relationships. 
First, multi-bi aid correlates negatively with the number of French aid recipient 
countries. The recent decrease in the number of bilateral aid recipients could indicate 
that multi-bi aid became a substitute for bilateral aid in recent years. It might also be 
due to a general tendency of DAC donors to concentrate on fewer countries in the 
realm of international commitments to reduce fragmentation. Second, multi-bi aid 
started growing and continuously increased during the year France assumed a 
leadership role as DAC chair but fell when France left the DAC chair. Though a 
causal relationship cannot be inferred, this pattern is strikingly clear. Third, multi-bi 
aid correlates with the share of multi-bi aid devoted to humanitarian relief. This simply 
shows that France responds together with other donors to humanitarian disasters 
through ad-hoc emergency trust funds. 
While these bivariate correlations have the advantage of being intuitive, they do not 
allow accounting for time trends or variables that simultaneously influence the 
amount of multi-bi aid. Therefore, the next step will be to estimate multivariate 
regressions.  
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 This period is most useful for comparisons across as donors, as all major donors had established 
multi-bi aid programs by 2006 and reporting quality had become sufficiently high. 
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5.  Multivariate analysis 
This section uses different econometric methods to systematically test the sixteen 
hypotheses about the donor characteristics that potentially explain multi-bi aid. 
Multivariate statistical analysis allows accounting simultaneously for several factors 
that might affect the amount of multi-bi aid a donor country provides. An estimated 
coefficient multiplied by the change in the corresponding variable represents the 
average importance of this variable on the amount of multi-bi aid provided. The 
significance level indicates whether this variable is closely related to multi-bi aid in 
most cases.18 The coefficient value and its statistical significance must be considered 
together to judge the economic and statistical importance of a variable in explaining 
multi-bi aid. When interpreting the results, note that the econometric methods applied 
in this study allow identifying relevant and robust relationships but may not be 
interpreted as causal links.  
5.1  Data 
The data comes from the new multi-bi aid data set that improves upon the data in the 
Creditor Reporting System of the OECD/DAC (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015). In 
particular, the OECD/DAC data provide information on multilateral implementing 
channels only from the mid-2000s onwards and even for this short period, reporting 
quality varies within and across reporting donors. We extend the CRS dataset 
backwards to account for multi-bi aid flows since 1990. Taking the perspective of 
multilateral organizations, we also assess the depth of earmarking of each individual 
aid activity delegated to a multilateral organization. As our data only includes 
genuinely earmarked contributions and corrects for some coding errors in the original 
data, the aggregate aid amounts obtained for multi-bi and bilateral aid slightly differ 
from OECD/DAC data (see Figure 20). 
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 Thresholds of 90%, 95% and 99% are commonly used. 
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Figure 20: Comparing the multi-bi aid dataset with OECD/DAC data (1990-2012) 
 
 
Data for the variables of interest and the controls are drawn from different sources 
and sometimes have missing values. It is well-known that missing data entails 
efficiency losses and might even result in biased results. For the Extreme Bound 
Analysis in particular, missing data is an issue because changes in coefficients may 
either result from changes in the sample size or the combination of variables. In our 
main analysis, we thus use a dataset in which all explanatory variables are imputed 
using multiple imputation (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011).19 The imputed 
dataset has 529 observations (23 OECD/DAC donors observed over 23 years). A 
missingness map and results for the original dataset can be found in the Appendix. 
Note that in the imputed and non-imputed sample, we replace missing values in the 
dependent variable by zero, which is interpreting them as zero aid flows. Descriptive 
statistics for all variables and detailed variable descriptions are shown in Table A-7 
(see Appendix).  
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 We draw five samples, specifying the following options for the imputation routine: no time trend, 
proper bounds for each variable based on its empirical range, leads and lags used to fill in values, and 
imputation within each cross-section based on the time-series information. 
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5.2  Methods 
The econometric analysis proceeds in four steps and uses different econometric 
methods that are explained in some detail in the beginning of each section. Note that 
none of the method identifies causal relations in the strict sense though they 
systematically test for robust relationships between variables. Section 5.3 tests the 
sixteen hypotheses for all DAC donors to obtain the average importance of all 
variables of interest. We discuss the sensitivity of the results to imputation and the 
assumption of a closed budget and present robustness to alternative model 
specifications using an Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). In section 5.4, the 
importance of the variables for explaining multi-bi, multilateral and bilateral aid 
budgets are compared using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) analysis. 
Finally, section 5.5 shows how the importance of variables differs between France 
and each of the ten largest donors of development aid. The separate regression for 
each donor country is estimated using ridge regressions that allow circumventing the 
problem of low degrees of freedom. The sections apply different econometric 
methods for analyzing a multitude of questions. The following comments apply to all 
or several of these methods. 
In sections 5.3 and 5.4, we use the full data set that includes all 23 DAC donors over 
23 years (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015). The repeated observations of each 
donor country over a long time horizon allow us to control for a time trend in the use 
of multi-bi aid. Moreover, the data structure allows reducing unobservable or 
unmeasurable differences across donors that could explain their use of multi-bi aid. 
This so-called fixed-effect approach allows obtaining estimates that are more likely to 
be statically valid, i.e. unbiased and consistent. We also apply the random-effects 
approach that assumes that individual effects are uncorrelated with the other 
predictors.20 Although the assumptions of this procedure needed for obtaining 
unbiased coefficients are more restrictive, the random-effect approach allows 
estimating the impact of time-invariant characteristics on multi-bi aid (e.g. EU 
membership), which is not possible in fixed-effect regressions.  
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of multi-bi 
commitments provided for purposes other than debt relief and humanitarian aid.21 
Besides regressions on multi-bi aid, we also run regressions on the share of multi-bi 
aid in total aid and find that our results do not hinge on the assumption of a closed or 
                                                          
20
 Fixed-effect models do not make this assumption and omit non-varying variables. A Hausman test 
rejects the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. We suspect that this is mainly due to our main control 
variables as coefficients on our variables of interest are similar. We hence show results from both 
approaches. 
21
 While debt relief is often multi-bi aid because it is earmarked for specific recipients, it tends to be the 
result of multilateral negotiations not studied here. It is common in the literature to analyze aid net of 
debt relief (e.g., OECD 2012; Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp 2014; Reinsberg, Michaelowa and 
Eichenauer 2015). We also subtract multi-bi aid for humanitarian purposes as it is driven by 
unforeseen catastrophes and an important share of humanitarian aid commitments are made at 
pledging conferences. 
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open budget.22 In all estimations, we control for non-linear time trends in the use of 
multi-bi aid by including linear, squared and cubic time variables and estimate 
cluster-robust standard errors. In sum, we estimate equations of the following form: 
ln(multi-bi aid commitments)it = β’Ait-1 + γ’ Bit-1 + η’ Cit + σi + λt  +(λt)2  + (λt)3 + εit, 
where our dependent variable represents the logged multi-bi aid a donor i provides in 
year t net of humanitarian aid and debt relief. Vector A contains our variables of 
interest. B is the vector of (lagged) control variables (see section 4). Vector C stands 
for contemporaneously included logged total aid, or, alternatively, bilateral and 
multilateral flows separately. Fixed-effect regressions also include σi, which represent 
donor-specific time-invariant effects. All regressions include time trends up to the 
third polynomial order.  
5.3  The determinants of multi-bi aid across all 23 DAC donors 
This section tests the sixteen hypotheses introduced above by estimating the 
average importance of the variables of interest for all 23 DAC donors over the 1990-
2012 period. We first discuss random-effect results that include time-invariant 
variables before looking at the statistically more stringent fixed-effect estimations. 
Hypotheses testing 
Table A-8 shows the results from random-effect estimations. Columns 1-4 include the 
variables associated with one of the four sets of hypotheses; international politics, 
domestic politics in the donor country, aid preferences, and aid management, 
respectively, as well as the control variables. Column 5 includes all of those variables 
simultaneously while column 6 further adds the dummies for donor-age groups and 
replenishment years. We find that international political factors are relevant predictors 
of multi-bi aid and confirm the positive relationship between a donor’s international 
engagement and multi-bi aid (H1, columns 1, 5, 6). As hypothesized, EU 
membership is negatively associated with multi-bi aid, though the variable is 
significant in Column 1 only (H4). Generally, domestic politics seems to be of minor 
importance though results in the relevant columns (2, 5, 6) provide support that 
incoming aid ministers significantly reduce multi-bi aid (H8). The results also lend 
support for the positive relationship between donor transparency and multi-bi aid 
(H9).  
Regarding donors’ aid preferences, we find support for the hypothesis that donor 
countries without colonial history or few aid relationships with former colonies provide 
more multi-bi aid (H10, columns 3, 5, 6). There is little evidence that political motives 
in bilateral aid allocation decrease multi-bi aid and no evidence that more altruistic 
donors provide more multi-bi aid in average. The final set of hypotheses relates to 
the donor’s aid management and practice. There is strong evidence that more 
independent aid agencies (type IV) use multi-bi aid to a larger extent (H14, 
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 More precisely, the dependent variable in this case is the log odds of the multi-bi aid share over the 
share of all remaining aid as of total aid. 
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columns 4, 5, 6). At the same time, donors with a separate bilateral implementing 
agency (type III) use multi-bi aid to a lesser degree. Donors that have conducted 
multilateral assessments are less likely to use multi-bi aid though the coefficient is 
significant in column 4 only. While this provides support for H16 about the 
assessments being an indicator of genuine interest in multilateral aid, the SUR 
analysis below will reveal if conducting multilateral assessments is also related to 
multilateral aid. We do not find clear evidence on the relations of multi-bi aid with the 
remaining indicators of donors’ aid management, including number of aid recipients, 
aid quality, or DAC chairmanship.  
With respect to the control variables, it is noteworthy that multi-bi aid is negatively 
related to the total aid budget, significantly so in columns 1-3. Donor countries’ 
wealth, size or changes in their debt level are not systematically related to multi-bi aid 
envelopes. As expected, the potential confounder of underreporting is highly 
significant and negative: donors with a lower share of detailed aid activities reported 
to the OECD are also less likely to provide multi-bi aid simply because these donors 
also report less about their earmarked aid. In column 6, we find evidence that the 
donor group of “traditional latecomers” that started their aid program after the 1970s 
provide significantly less multi-bi aid. There is no statistically statistical indication that 
being in the donor grouping of “least experienced donors” or the in a replenishment 
years affect the amounts of multi-bi aid (column 6). 
In sum, random effect results provide support for seven of sixteen hypotheses. 
Moreover, we find that the signs of insignificant variables are mostly as hypothesized 
and run various robustness checks to check for the sensitivity of these estimates 
(see next section). 
We now add donor-fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics of donor countries such as a general positive opinion in the population 
towards multilateral organizations or development aid.23 However, this means that we 
cannot test the three hypotheses measured by time-invariant variables (i.e., EU 
membership (H4), number of aid ministries (H13), aid agency type (H14)). 
Table A-9 shows results for fixed-effect regressions. Confirming random-effect 
results, we find strong support for the relationship between international engagement 
and multi-bi aid (H1). The negative association between a change in the aid minister 
and multi-bi aid persists, though significantly so only in Column 2 (H8). We obtain 
again large, negative and highly significant point estimates for the share of colonies 
among recipients (H10) with the other measure of the politicization of aid, the change 
in the R-square, is also negative but insignificant. There is evidence that 
improvements in the quality of aid is associated with more multi-bi aid (H15) while 
donors that have conducted multilateral aid assessments provide less earmarked aid 
(H16). We find that multi-bi aid is negatively related to increases in donors’ absolute 
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 In principle, survey data could be used to control for public opinion about foreign aid or multilateral 
organizations but data is too sparse for imputation to be an option (for an overview of available survey 
data see Eichenauer and Hug 2014).  
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wealth, implying that as a donor becomes richer through growth – controlled for 
population – it tends to provide less multi-bi aid. Again, we find that multi-bi aid 
decreases as the total aid budget increases.  
In sum, the fixed-effect results confirm five hypotheses whereof four were found to be 
significant already in the random effect regressions. Note however that two 
hypotheses previously found significant cannot be tested in the fixed effect 
framework because the variables are time-invariant (i.e., aid agency type, EU 
membership). The great similarity of the results between the tables suggests that our 
control variables are meaningful.  
We tested the sensitivity of the random- and fixed-effect results by estimating 
alternative specifications. In particular, we added more control variables, including 
variables that characterize the economic situation of the donor country. None of 
these variables were statistically significant or changed the previous results. We also 
used the log odds of the share of multi-bi aid instead of the total amount as the 
dependent variable to test whether or not our results hinge on the open budget 
assumption. The findings were again very similar. Finally, we also tested the 
hypotheses on the non-imputed sample. Though the sample size dropped 
significantly in some models, the prior results on EU membership and independent 
aid agency (for random-effects), multilateral assessments, and international 
engagement persisted. For recent G8 hosts, we found a positive coefficient in 
random and fixed effect regressions. The random effect regression showed some 
evidence that more altruistic donors provide less multi-bi aid. These results show 
robust support for several hypotheses suggested in the literature and policy reports. 
Specifically, the evidence suggests that internationally engaged donors (H1) with an 
independent aid agency (H14) provide more and a higher share of multi-bi aid while 
EU members (H4) and donors with strong colonial ties in their bilateral aid (H10) 
provide less earmarked aid. Incoming aid ministers (H8) and donors having assessed 
multilateral organizations (H16) are associated with smaller multi-bi aid budgets. 
There is also evidence that an improvement in aid quality is positively related to 
multi-bi aid (H15), with quality being measured by an index composed of the 
respective shares of untied aid, aid to least developed countries, and to good 
governance countries. These results do not hinge on the imputed data or the 
assumption of an open budget. 
Robustness test using Extreme Bounds Analysis 
On top of the sensitivity checks described above, we employ Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) to test for the robustness of the relationships found in column 5 of 
Tables A-8 and A-9. An EBA implies estimating a large number of random 
combinations of explanatory variables. We use this method to preempt concerns 
about the sensitivity of the results presented in the previous section to alterations in 
the set of independent variables.  
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We show results of an EBA with random effects in Table A-10 and of an EBA with 
donor-fixed effects in Table A-11. The EBA is specified to conduct 10% of all possible 
variable combinations, resulting in 4,378 randomly drawn specifications for the 
random-effect EBA and in 2,176 combinations for the fixed-effects EBA.24 We specify 
that EBA models can include up to five different candidate variables included at a 
time (doubtful variables). We always control for donor wealth, donor size, the change 
in public debt, total aid, the share of underreported aid and the time polynomials (so-
called free variables). We add the dummy variables for agency types III and IV as 
free variables in the random-effect EBA. For both EBAs, we impose the restriction 
that the two proxies for political motivations (share of colonies and R-square) may 
never appear in the same regression.  
Table A-10 shows the results for the EBA with random effects and provides details 
about the lower and the upper bound of the point estimates, the mean t-statistic, the 
share of estimates found be statistically significant at the five percent level, and the 
share of coefficients that lie above zero. Many variables are non-robust predictors 
because the coefficients switch signs between specifications or because they are 
insignificant in all or most cases. However, the significant predictors in the previous 
section turn out robust. Political globalization (H1), the share of multilateral aid (H1), 
the share of colonies among recipients (H10), and the share of underreported aid 
display the right signs and are statistically significant in all regressions with large 
mean t-statistics. There is also evidence that donor transparency (H9) and 
independent aid agencies (type IV, H14) are associated with larger multi-bi aid 
budgets. Mirroring previous results, we find consistent negative signs for a change in 
the aid minister variable (H8) and for multilateral assessment (H16) though the 
coefficients are only significant in some or even no regressions. The politics 
coefficient is also consistently negative though mostly insignificant (H10). The 
remaining results are ambiguous.  
The results from an EBA with fixed effects are presented in Table A-11 and similar in 
many respects. International engagement (H1) measured by political globalization 
and the share of multilateral aid, the share of colonies among recipients (H10), donor 
multilateral assessment (H16), growth of donor wealth , and the share of 
underreported aid are always significant and have the expected signs. We thus find 
very robust support for three of the four hypotheses that we found statistically 
significant in the previous section. Moreover, negative signs and sometimes 
significant results can be observed when donor preferences are farther away from 
IDA’s allocation (H3), political motives loom large (H10), or the population in the 
donor country or total aid increase. The aid minister coefficient (H8) is always 
negative but never significant, suggesting that the variable might only have an effect 
in a well-specified model.  
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 The number of random draws is higher for the random-effect EBA because the three time-invariant 
variables increase the number of possible combinations. 
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The Extreme Bound Analyses offer robust support for previous results. While some 
variables previously identified as relevant predictors were insignificant, the signs 
never switched. We conclude from these EBAs that four hypotheses have extremely 
robust support while three additional hypotheses have a consistent though not 
always significant association with the provided amounts of multi-bi aid.  
5.4  Comparing the determinants of multi-bi aid, bilateral and multilateral aid across 
all 23 DAC donors 
While some of the sixteen hypotheses are multi-bi specific, several others were 
derived from the general literature on (aid) budgets. Therefore, we seek to assess 
the common determinants of the three aid channels and to what extent multi-bi aid is 
determined by different factors than bilateral and multilateral aid. For studying this 
comparative question, the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) is 
most adequate because it accounts for contemporaneous error correlation across 
equations. Table A-12 shows the results for a fixed-effect SUR model based on the 
imputed data for all 23 DAC donors. The dependent variables are (ln) bilateral aid, 
(ln) multilateral aid, and (ln) multi-bi aid in columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Note that 
we omit the share of multilateral aid previously included as second measure for the 
hypothesis about international engagement (H1) because of trivial correlation with a 
dependent variable (i.e., multilateral aid). Thus multi-bi aid (column 3 in Table A-12) 
does not exactly match previous fixed effect results (column 5 in Table A-9).  
All three aid channels are positively and significantly related to the donor’s 
international engagement (H1). However, multi-bi aid is different than both bilateral 
and multilateral aid in most aspects as indicated by switching signs between the first 
two and the last regressions and different significance level. Most strikingly, 
multilateral and bilateral aid budgets are significantly and positively related to the 
politicization of aid (H10, measured by the share of colonies in bilateral aid), while the 
coefficient is large, negative and highly significant for multi-bi aid. Multilateral and 
bilateral aid show a significant negative relationship with interest divergence in 
government (H7) while the coefficient for multi-bi aid is positive though insignificant. 
Moreover, vested interests in the aid bureaucracy (H12, measured by the number of 
recipient countries) increase multilateral and bilateral aid budgets to a small but 
significant effect.  
Several variables are significantly associated with multi-bi aid only. Quality of aid 
(H15), donor commitment to multilateral policy (H16, measured by donor 
assessments) as well as changes in donor wealth and population are associated with 
multi-bi aid only. Finally, the control variable share of underreported aid shows a 
negative and significant association with the size of all three aid budgets. Note that 
the adjusted R-squared is highest for multi-bi aid (0.77), suggesting that our variables 
explain the variation in multi-bi aid quite well and better than other types of aid. 
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5.5  The specific determinants of French multi-bi aid  
As a last step, we compare the determinants of multi-bi aid across the largest donor 
countries.25 For this purpose, we run separate regressions for each donor country 
over the 23 years of observation (time-series regressions). The estimated coefficients 
in this application must be interpreted as the average marginal effect of a change in 
the variable of interest within a specific donor country. This implies that time-invariant 
characteristics cannot be included in the analysis. Note that we control for a time 
trend up to the third polynomial order. 
This donor-specific approach creates the statistical problem that we have more 
potential predictors than observations (so-called “insufficient degrees of freedom 
problem”), which implies that we choose not to rely on the previously used statistical 
methods to estimate the donor-regressions. To resolve this problem, we employ a 
technique called “ridge regression” (Hastie, Buja, and Tibshirani 1995). While 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) – the most common estimation approach used in the 
previous sections – minimizes the mean squared error of the residuals to estimate 
the regression coefficients, ridge regression simultaneously minimizes the mean 
squared error and the standardized regression coefficients. Technically, this is 
achieved by penalizing too large coefficients (the penalty parameter is optimally 
chosen during the estimation using a cross-validation procedure). In this way, the 
optimization saves some degrees of freedom, which allows estimating a regression 
even when the number of potential predictors exceeds the number of available 
observations.26 Ridge regression thus trade the unbiasedness of estimates against a 
reduced variance which often results in a lower (mean squared) error than OLS 
(Breheny 2013). Note that the slight bias toward zero of the coefficients makes us 
only less likely to find significant relationships and is thus statistically unproblematic. 
The adjusted R2, calculated similarly as in OLS, shows that these regressions have 
explanatory power, despite the low number of observations.27 However, the low 
number of observations calls for interpreting results reluctantly as small increases in 
the sample size can greatly affect results.    
Three issues are important for the interpretation of these results. First, all coefficients 
are standardized between zero and one implying that larger coefficient values can 
directly be interpreted as larger effect sizes. Second, some coefficients are missing, 
which is due to lack of variation over time in the relevant indicator for a given donor 
(e.g., no German colonies). Third, note that the differences in coefficients across 
equations cannot be compared as we do not have a nested model.   
Table A-13 shows ten regressions, which compare France with the Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, the United States, 
Canada, and Japan. Given the wealth of results in the table, our discussion focuses 
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 Selection of these donor countries was coordinated with AFD. 
26
 We use the R package ridge to estimate all results from ridge regressions. 
27
 The R² is defined as the residual sum of squares plus the penalty-weighted absolute size of all 
coefficients divided by the total sum of squares (see also, Breheny 2013). 
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on the results for France and the differences with other donors and the results 
obtained for the average donor in previous sections. 
International engagement (H1), as measured by the KOF index of political 
globalization, is positively associated with multi-bi aid for all donors including France 
but excluding the United States, which might be different because of her global role 
as hegemon. The coefficient is small and insignificant for France which can be 
explained by its high level of political globalization throughout the period of 
observation. For half of the donors, the relationship is significant as it robustly was for 
the average donor in previous sections. Hosting a G8 summit (H2) obviously is 
different from zero only for G8 members. For France, we find a positive but 
insignificant relationship with multi-bi aid. For other G8 members, the sign switches 
and, again, the United States are significantly different. France seems to complement 
multilateral aid using its multi-bi aid whenever its preferences diverge from the 
consensus allocation in the International Development Association (H3), while other 
donors do not seem to be motivated by this factor. Multi-bi aid seems to be motivated 
by peer effort for all donors including France though the coefficient is insignificant 
and smallest for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which are commonly 
considered as leading the multi-bi trend. In France and the Netherlands, left-wing 
governments significantly increased multi-bi aid while this effect is negative for 
Germany and no partisan effect is visible for other donor countries (H6). Preference 
diversity in governments generally has little impact on the multi-bi aid budget of 
donors, except in Denmark and Belgium (H7). Incoming French aid ministers have 
reduced multi-bi aid in average while there is no effect for any of the other donor 
countries (H8). For remaining hypotheses, we find no significant relationships or 
large coefficients for France. With regard to the control variables, we find that multi-bi 
aid is positively associated with growing donor wealth and population. Finally, the 
Pseudo R-square suggests that our specification explain the behavior of some 
donors quite well (United States and United Kingdom) but not others (Sweden, 
Canada, Germany). The explanatory power of our specification for France is 
moderate. We suggest using qualitative research to determine additional and 
country-specific motivations for the use of multi-bi aid which is beyond what 
quantitative data analysis can accomplish due to the statistical problems resulting 
from a small number of observations. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper studies the French use of multi-bi aid through document analysis and 
statistical comparisons with the aid allocation of other donor countries. The rise in 
earmarked aid over the last two decades challenges the funding and operation model 
of multilateral organizations and raises questions about its role in the aid architecture.  
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This study finds that France uses substantially less multi-bi aid than other donors. 
The sectoral allocation of French multi-bi aid is similar to its bilateral allocation while 
the geographical allocation of its multi-bi aid is relatively more focused on African 
countries and regional activities. Compared to other donor countries, French multi-bi 
aid is earmarked little in terms of sectors but strongly at the geographical level. 
In contrast to other donors, the bulk of French multi-bi aid is allocated among nine 
global funds operating in the French priority areas of health, education and the 
environment, notably climate change. Beyond financial clout, France influences 
sectoral policies by holding (rotating) seats in a number of these governing bodies. A 
smaller share of French multi-bi aid is allocated to trust funds managed by 
international development organizations. Among World Bank-managed trust funds, 
France mainly supports well-established multi-donor funds and launched only a few 
single-donor trust funds. This is laudable as the proliferation of small initiatives 
increases overhead costs and fragmentation in the delivery of development 
assistance. Moreover, single-donor trust funds are often criticized for their “advocacy 
role” in the World Bank. The analysis finds evidence that some trust funds are 
supported by several French aid institution which suggests room for better 
coordination of the financing. More generally, France and other donor countries need 
to assess and strategize carefully the usefulness role of their multi-bi aid as an aid 
channel on top of multilateral and bilateral aid to avoid within-donor fragmentation.  
Using various multivariate statistical methods, we attempt to explain the varying use 
of multi-bi aid by donor countries and examine the differences in determinants of 
bilateral, multilateral and multi-bi aid. Note that our careful analysis only allows claims 
about systematic relationships and not causal relationships. Through systematic 
testing of sixteen hypotheses, we establish three robust determinants and find 
evidence for an additional four factors that are related to the size of multi-bi aid 
budgets for the average donor. Most robustly, we find that internationally engaged 
donors provide more multi-bi, bilateral and multilateral aid (Hypothesis 1). The 
politicization of bilateral aid is negatively related with multi-bi aid because politically 
motivated aid is better provided bilaterally rather than delegated and channeled 
through a multilateral organization (Hypothesis 10). We further find robust evidence 
that donors with an active multilateral policy provide less multi-bi aid in average, 
possibly because they are more aware of the implications for multilateral 
organizations (Hypothesis 16). There is also evidence that European Union members 
provide less multi-bi aid in average, which could be due to the fact that they already 
provide substantial amounts through the European Commission (Hypothesis 4). 
Incoming aid ministers lead to a reduced use of multi-bi aid, which may result from 
the possibility to reduced or re-allocated multi-bi aid to support bilateral aid priorities 
of the minister more easily than other budget items (Hypothesis 8). Furthermore, 
multi-bi aid budgets are higher in more transparent donor countries (Hypothesis 9) 
with an independent aid agency (Hypothesis 14). 
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Multi-bi aid is found to be related to different explanatory factors than multilateral and 
bilateral aid budgets which are relatively similar. Most strikingly, multilateral and 
bilateral aid budgets are higher when aid is more politicized while multi-bi aid is 
reduced (Hypothesis 10). We also examine the explaining factors for multi-bi aid for 
France and nine other major donors of development assistance separately. The 
results in this part of the analysis must be interpreted particularly cautiously due to 
the small sample size. We find that a majority of major donor countries increases 
their multi-bi aid in response to multi-bi aid increases by their peers (Hypothesis 5). 
This effect is not observed for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which are 
leading providers of multi-bi aid. Multi-bi aid seems to be motivated by quite different 
factors in France than in other major donor countries. Increasing divergence in the 
donor’s bilateral aid allocation and the allocation of the World Bank’s concessional 
arm, the International Development Association (IDA), is associated with more multi-
bi aid for France but not for other donors (Hypothesis 3). Moreover, left-wing 
governments provide more multi-bi aid while in average incoming aid ministers 
decrease the multi-bi budget (Hypothesis 6). While our statistical modelling of French 
motivations for multi-bi aid highlights some explanatory factors, we suggest using 
qualitative research to determine additional and France-specific motivations for the 
use of multi-bi aid. This is beyond what quantitative data analysis can accomplish 
due to the statistical problems resulting from the small number of observations. 
Having commissioned this study on multi-bi aid, the French government and the 
French Development Agency have demonstrated that they are aware of the potential 
repercussions that the extensive use of earmarked funding by other donor countries 
might have for French influence and the success of the French strategy in multilateral 
organizations This study has established that the French government still uses multi-
bi aid to a smaller extent that other donors though volumes have been increasing. If 
France decides to increase its earmarked aid, it should carefully assess the value-
added for France of supporting these funds, in particular smaller and single-donor 
trust funds. Moreover, the study suggests policy space for improving inter-agency 
coordination which might be achieved through an encompassing trust fund 
engagement policy. 
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Appendix 
Figure A-1: The French aid architecture  
 
 
Other relevant ministries involved in APD: 
 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries  
 Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development 
 Ministry of Higher Education and Research 
 Ministry of Immigration and National Identity 
 
Other relevant bodies: 
 Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
 CDC Climat  
 National Institute for Agronomic Research 
 
Source: AidFlows.org; MAEID 2014 
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Figure A-2: Global map of French bilateral assistance, 2013 
 
Source: EU Donor Atlas 
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Figure A-3: Sector map of French bilateral assistance, 2013 
 
Source: EU Donor Atlas 
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Table A-4: French participation in pass-through multilaterals 
Notes: Last three columns show whether or not the relevant actor has made a financial contribution to the fund. 
Sources: AidFlows.org; fund websites; climatefundsupdate.org; multi-bi aid dataset; MAEDI 2014 
                                                          
28
 Information on holding agencies not available 
29
 held in a separate account termed “Ministry of the Economy” 
30
 also supported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
31
 also supported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the National Institute for Agronomic Research 
32
 Other French ministries also hold accounts 
33
 held in a separate account termed “Ministry of the Economy“ 
Pass-through multilateral Contribution 
period 
Cumulative 
contributions 
(USD million) 
Number of EU 
members 
MFCP MAEID AFD 
Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) 2003 2015 4150.0 10 x x   
UNITAID28 2006 2015 1140.3 5       
Global Environment Facility (GEF)29 1999 2014 1010.0 18 x     
International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) 2007 2015 541.0 6 x   x 
Clean Technology Fund (CTF)30 2011 2011 266.0 5     x 
Montreal Protocol Fund 1991 2014 236.0 7 x x x 
GAVI Alliance 2011 2015 130.0 10 x   x 
Education For All - Fast-track Initiative (EFA-FTI) 2008 2014 89.8 12   x x 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 2003 2010 59.1 (14) x     
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)31 1999 2015 31.4 6 x x   
MENA Transition Fund  2013 2014 13.2 4 x     
Africa Program for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC) 2002 2009 8.5 9 x x   
Commercial Debt Reduction Facility (DRF) 1999 2004 6.6 5 x     
Adaptation Fund (UN-AF) 2014 2015 5.6 6   x   
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) 2001 2012 4.5 6 x   x 
Cities Alliance32 2002 2013 3.7 3   x x 
Green Climate Fund 2013 2015 1.6 12 x     
Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) 2005 2005 1.4 4   x   
Nagoya Program Implementation Fund (NPIF)33 2012 2012 1.2 0 x     
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Table A-5: French contributions to World Bank trust funds 
  Fund name Contribution 
period 
Cumulative 
contributions 
(USD million) 
MFCP MAEDI AFD 
MNA-FS MNA VPU FREE-STANDING TRUST FUND PROGRAM 2008 2015 45.40 x   x 
CTF CONSULTANT TRUST FUND 2002 2005 36.00 x x   
HRTF HAITI RECONSTRUCTION FUND 2011 2012 32.30     x 
ARTF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND 2009 2014 27.10 x     
HOLDTF HOLDING TRUST FUNDS 2010 2015 22.60 x     
FCPFR FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY34 2009 2015 20.30    x 
ISF INTEREST SUBSIDY FUND (ISF) 1999 1999 20.10 x     
IFC IFC TA TRUST FUNDS 1999 2015 17.40 x x x 
GEFCC GEF - CLIMATE CONTROL 2004 2010 14.60 x     
WBGTF WEST BANK & GAZA-NON-IBRD FUNDED 2005 2007 11.00 x     
AEITF AFRICA EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRUST FUND 2014 2014 10.00 x     
BIOCFT BIOCARBON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRUST FUND 2005 2010 9.00     x 
LSCTF LEBANON SYRIAN CRISIS TRUST FUND 2015 2015 8.83 x x x 
CGAP CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOREST 2003 2015 8.72 x x x 
WBI WORLD BANK INSTITUTE (FORMERLY EDI)35 1999 2011 8.10 x x   
FS-SP FREE STANDING - SINGLE PURPOSE TF36 2008 2009 7.74  x 
DFSP DONOR FUNDED STAFFING PROGRAM 2006 2015 6.91   x   
MCMI MARSEILLE CENTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN INTEGRATION37 2011 2015 6.52 x x x 
NBI NILE BASIN INITIATIVE TRUST FUND 2006 2010 5.90     x 
FTIE EFA FTI EDUCATION PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT FUND 2007 2008 5.85     x 
ESMAP ENERGY SECTOR MANAGEMEN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 2000 2012 4.89   x x 
                                                          
34
 also CDC Climat 
35
 also Ministry of Agriculture 
36
 also Ministry of Immigration 
37
 Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
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DS GENERAL DEBT SERVICE TRUST FUND 2005 2013 4.59 x     
PWUD PARTNERSHIP FOR WATER & URBAN DEVELOPMENT 2015 2015 4.39     x 
MISC MISCELLANEOUS TF 1999 2006 3.65 x     
AFRSD AFR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT38 1999 2010 3.60   x x 
CTFBK INTEGRATED CONSULTANT TRUST FUND 2003 2006 2.70 x x   
SSATP AFRICA TRANSPORT POLICY PROGRAM 2005 2013 2.31 x x x 
MDRP MULTI COUNTRY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEG 2003 2003 2.08   x   
WSP WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAM(WSP) 2006 2010 2.07     x 
FTI-S FTI SECRETARIAT 2005 2011 1.95   x x 
EITI EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITI 2007 2014 1.81 x x   
REIMB REIMBURSABLE ARRANGEMENTS 2005 2005 1.66 x     
GFDRR GLOBAL FACILITY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION 2009 2013 1.63   x   
FS-CFP FREE-STANDING TFS FOR CFP 2010 2010 1.43 x     
GGFR GLOBAL GAS FLARING REDUCTION 2007 2013 1.35 x     
FIAS IFC-FOREIGN INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICE 2007 2007 1.33 x     
CAADP CAADP PROCESSES 2010 2011 1.33   x   
ASEM ASIAN EMERGENCY TRUST FUND (ASEM) 2004 2007 1.31 x     
WAVES WEALTH ACCOUNTING & EVALUATION ECOSYSTEM  2013 2013 1.05     x 
CFASST CARBON FINANCE ASSIST39 2006 2007 0.93     x 
PEFA PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 2004 2014 0.83   x   
PROFSH PROGRAM ON FISHERIES 2006 2013 0.80     x 
KCP KNOWLEDGE FOR CHANGE PROGRAM 2006 2008 0.79   x   
INFOD INFODEV 2005 2005 0.78   x   
MFCD MDTF UMBRELLA FACILITY FOR CAPACITY DEVT 2013 2013 0.67   x   
TFSCB STATISTICAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM 2002 2006 0.63   x   
FS-SDN FREE-STANDING TFS FOR SDN 2008 2009 0.48   x   
FEDC FRENCH EDUCATION MANAGEMENT TRUST FUND  2007 2008 0.47     x 
ALIVE AFRICAN LIVESTOCK PARTNERSHIP(ALIVE) 2006 2009 0.41   x   
                                                          
38
 also Ministry of Agriculture  
39
 also Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development 
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MDDMAD MDTF DEVELOPMENT MARKETPLACE40 2008 2009 0.28 Ministry of Immigration   
STAR STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE 2010 2012 0.27       
DFSG DIAGNOSTIC FACILITY ON SHARED GROWTH 2007 2007 0.21     x 
IAASTD INTL ASST OF AGRI SCIENCE & TECH FOR DEV 2005 2006 0.21   x   
AFRCC AFRICA CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAM 2013 2013 0.13     x 
TDRP TRANSITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION & REINTEGRAT 2011 2015 0.13   x   
ADPTSE ADAPT-SEC 2009 2009 0.12 x     
SDA SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT 2005 2005 0.12 x     
PNOWB PARLIAMENT NETWORK ON THE WORLD BANK 2009 2009 0.11 x     
SPTF SINGLE PURPOSE TRUST FUNDS 2005 2011 0.11 x x   
EOSIC EVALUATION OFFICE SPECIAL INITIATIVES  2008 2008 0.03     x 
GEFCO GEF COFINANCING TRUST FUNDS 1999 1999 0.01 x     
Source: AidFlows.org 
 
                                                          
40
 Ministry of Immigration 
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Table A-6: Hypotheses and corresponding measures 
 
 
A: International politics 
 
H1. Multi-bi aid correlates positively with a donor’s international engagement. KOF index: political globalization; 
 Share of multilateral aid 
H2. Multi-bi aid is positively related to having recently hosted a G8 summit. G8 host indicator 
H3. Donors provide more multi-bi aid if their preferences are not well aligned with 
multilateral aid. 
Distance to IDA allocation  
H4. EU membership negatively relates with multi-bi aid. (RE) EU member 
H5. A donor’s multi-bi aid effort has a positive relationship with the multi-bi effort of donor 
peers. 
Log(Peer effort) 
 
 
B: Domestic politics  
H6. Multi-bi aid budgets are higher for left-wing governments. Political ideology of government 
H7. The size of the multi-bi aid budget is positively related to interest divergence in 
government. 
Preference diversity in government 
H8. An incoming development minister is associated with a reduction in multi-bi aid in the 
first year in office. 
Aid minister change 
H9. Multi-bi aid is positively related to donor transparency. Absence of perceived corruption 
 
 
C: Donor preferences  
H10. Multi-bi aid is negatively associated with the importance of political motives in 
bilateral aid provision. 
Share of colonies among bilateral aid 
recipients; 
 Politics coefficient (partial R2) 
H11. Altruism in bilateral aid relates positively to multi-bi aid. Need coefficient (partial R2) 
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D: Characteristics of aid agencies  
H12. Vested interests in the aid bureaucracy relate negatively to multi-bi aid. Number of bilateral aid recipients; 
 Share of administrative costs in bilateral aid 
H13. Multi-bi aid relates negatively to the number of ministries involved in aid giving.(RE) Number of ministries involved in aid giving 
H14. Independent aid agencies are associated with higher multi-bi aid budgets.(RE) OECD/DAC: agency type 
H15. The ‘quality’ of a donor’s aid relates positively to multi-bi effort. QualityODA index 
H16. Donors with an active multilateral aid policy provide less multi-bi aid. Donor assessment of multilateral agencies; 
 Chair in DAC working group 
 
 
Control variables  
Donor size Donor population 
Donor wealth Donor GNI 
Economic downturn Change in public debt 
Total aid Total aid 
Underreporting Share of missing information in CRS data 
 
 
Robustness checks  
Older donors provide more multi-bi aid. (RE) Ordinal variable with three categories 
Replenishments of IDA, AfDB, AsDB, EDF, Global Fund, GEF For each IO: indicator variables for 
replenishment year 
Economic downturn Public debt, fiscal deficit, unemployment, 
inflation 
 
Notes: (RE) hypotheses can be tested only in random-effects regressions.
73 
Table A-7: Variables 
Dependent variable 
 
Log(Multi-bi aid) Logarithm of multi-bi aid (2011 constant USD). Multi-bi 
aid flows devoted to humanitarian aid and debt relief 
are excluded. 
  
Key predictors 
 
KOF index: political 
globalization 
KOF index, dimension covering political globalization 
(Dreher 2006) 
Multilateralism in foreign aid Share of multilateral aid as of total aid in % 
(Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2015, adapted from 
OECD/DAC Table 1) 
EU member Binary indicator variable for whether donor country is 
an EU member state, own coding 
Log(Peer effort) Logarithm of aggregated multi-bi aid (i.e., Log(Multi-bi 
aid)) by all other DAC donors 
Partisan position Average left-right partisan position of the government, 
using vote shares of the constituent parties as weights 
for coalition government, own calculation based on 
ParlGov data (Manow and Döring 2012) 
Preference diversity in 
government 
Maximum ideological distance among cabinet parties, 
using left-right positions of individual parties 
Aid minister change Binary indicator variable for whether aid minister 
changed in the previous year (Fuchs and Richert 2015) 
Country hosted G8 summit Binary indicator variable for whether country hosted a 
G8 summit in the previous year (Reinsberg, 
Michaelowa, and Knack 2015) 
Perceived corruption control Transparency International, perceived control of 
corruption (data from QoG 2015, imputed using Amelia 
II) 
Need coefficient (partial R2) Partial R-squared from auxiliary aid allocation 
regressions of the bilateral aid of each donor and each 
year, using two sets of predictors, donor self-interest 
variables, and need variables. The partial R-squared 
measures the relative improvement in the adjusted R-
squared when shifting from a model without the need 
variables to the model with them. Need variables 
include World Bank development indicators “Number of 
telephone lines per 1,000 inhabitants”, “Life expectancy 
at birth”, and  “GDP per capita” (QoG 2015), chosen 
based on data availability. Political variables include 
“Exports as of GDP”, “Imports as of GDP” (QoG 2015), 
whether the country had ever been colonized (own 
coding), and the “ideal point distance in UNGA voting” 
(original data from Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey 
(2009), imputed using Amelia II). The baseline model 
(without need or politics variables) includes population 
and its square. 
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Politics coefficient (partial R2) Partial R-squared from auxiliary aid allocation 
regressions of the bilateral aid of each donor and each 
year, using two sets of predictors, donor self-interest 
variables, and need variables. The partial R-squared 
measures the relative improvement in the adjusted R-
squared when shifting from a model without the politics 
variables to the model with them (see “need coefficient” 
above for further explanations).  
Share of colonies among 
recipients 
Lagged share of recipient countries that were former 
colonies, own coding 
QualityODA index Standardized index of aid quality, which summarizes 
the share of aid a donor gives to well-governed 
countries, the share of aid a donor gives to least 
developed countries, and the share of untied aid (raw 
data obtained from Fuchs and Richert 2015), lagged by 
one period. 
Administrative costs Administrative costs as of pure bilateral aid in % 
(OECD 2015) 
Number of recipient countries Number of bilateral aid recipient countries of a donor in 
the previous year 
Number of aid agencies Number of agencies from one donor country reporting 
to the Creditor Reporting System (OECD 2015) 
Donor assessement of 
multilateral agencies 
Binary indicator variable, turning 1 when a donor 
conducted an assessment of multilateral aid agencies 
(donor-specific, not MOPAN) and remaining 1 in the 
years following the assessment. 
Original coding based on OECD 2008, 2010, 2012. 
Chair in DAC working group Binary indicator variable for whether a donor held a 
chair in an OECD/DAC working group in the previous 
year (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2015) 
  
Control variables 
 
Log(Population) Logarithm of donor population (QoG 2015) 
Log(GNI) Logarithm of Gross National Income (QoG 2015) 
Change in public debt  Percentage point change in public debt as of GDP 
(QoG 2015) 
Log(Total aid) Logarithm of total Official Development Assistance of a 
donor (OECD 2015) 
Log(Bilateral aid) Logarithm of (pure) bilateral aid (OECD 2015) 
Log(Multilateral aid) Logarithm of multilateral aid (OECD 2015). These flows 
exclude the pro-rata (multilateral) contributions to the 
four pass-through multilaterals (i.e., GAVI, GEF, 
GFATM, EU) that ultimately become earmarked aid 
(see Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2014) 
Economic growth rate Economic growth in the donor country in % (QoG 
2015) 
Inflation rate Inflation rate in the donor country in % (QoG 2015) 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate in % (QoG 2015) 
Deficit as of GDP Fiscal deficit as of GDP in % (QoG 2015) 
Current account balance Current account balance (2012 constant million USD) 
(QoG 2015) 
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Year Year of observation 
Replenishment of IDA Binary indicator of IDA replenishment over the last year 
(own coding) 
Replenishment year of AfDF Binary indicator of AfDF replenishment over the last 
year (own coding) 
Replenishment year of AsDF Binary indicator of AsDF replenishment over the last 
year (own coding) 
Replenishment of GEF Binary indicator of GEF replenishment over the last 
year (own coding) 
Donor age Ordinal variable capturing donor age, distinguishing 
three groups: “Traditional donors” (bilateral aid 
program before the 1970s), “traditional latecomers” 
(bilateral aid program before 1990s), “latecomers” 
(bilateral aid program after 1990) – as reported in 
DAC1 tables (OECD 2015) 
Aid agency type Organizational model of foreign aid provision. Four 
organizational models are distinguished (OECD/DAC 
2009).  
Model 1: Development co-operation is an integral part 
of the ministry of foreign affairs which is responsible for 
policy and implementation. 
Model 2: A Development Co-operation Directorate has 
the lead role within the ministry of foreign affairs and is 
responsible for policy and implementation.  
Model 3: A ministry has overall responsibility for policy 
and a separate executing agency is responsible for 
implementation. 
Model 4: A ministry or agency, which is not the ministry 
of foreign affairs, is responsible for both policy and 
implementation. 
Share of underreported aid Share of underreported bilateral aid in the Creditor 
Reporting System (indicating the amount of potential 
underreporting in multi-bi aid) (OECD/DAC 2013, 
2014). We assume that aggregate amounts of bilateral 
aid, which exceed the amounts aggregated manually 
from CRS data, are correctly reported in the DAC1 
table. We also assume that reporting gaps are the 
same for pure bilateral aid and multi-bi aid. Hence, we 
can interpret the relative gap in the bilateral aid flows 
reported in both sources as the degree of 
underreporting in multi-bi aid. 
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Descriptive statistics of the key variables 
 N Mean Sd Min Max 
Dependent variable 
     
Log(Multi-bi aid) 529 13.45 7.80 0.00 21.87 
      
Key predictors 
     
KOF index: political globalization 529 88.32 9.93 45.34 98.43 
Multilateralism in foreign aid 529 33.03 13.70 2.38 84.99 
Country hosted G8 summit 529 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Preference distance to IDA activities 529 7.96 9.25 0.72 60.47 
EU member 529 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Log(Peer effort) 529 21.07 1.30 17.21 23.16 
Partisan position 529 5.51 1.46 2.15 8.66 
Preference diversity in government  529 1.53 1.60 0.00 5.63 
Aid minister change 529 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Perceived corruption control 529 7.70 1.57 2.99 10.00 
Share of colonies among recipients 529 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Politics coefficient (partial R2 approach) 529 0.85 1.54 0.00 10.00 
Need coefficient (partial R2 approach) 529 0.60 0.83 -0.75 10.00 
Number of recipient countries 529 93.19 38.35 0.00 155.00 
Administrative costs 529 6.03 3.26 0.00 27.80 
Number of aid agencies 529 10.22 6.79 3.00 31.00 
Aid agency: type III 529 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Aid agency: type IV 529 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
QualityODA index 529 0.06 1.59 -4.10 7.74 
Donor assessment of multilateral 
agencies 529 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Chair in DAC working group 529 0.18 0.44 0.00 3.00 
      
Key controls 
     
Log(GNI) 529 13.29 1.36 10.06 16.55 
Log(Population) 529 16.59 1.41 12.84 19.56 
Change in public debt 529 1.23 5.34 -12.22 27.36 
Share of underreported aid 529 0.28 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Log(Total aid) 529 21.24 2.98 0.00 24.37 
      
Other control variables 
     
Log(Multilateral aid) 529 20.03 2.82 0.00 22.65 
Log(Bilateral aid) 529 20.81 2.95 0.00 24.17 
Traditional latecomer 529 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
New donor 529 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Replenishment of IDA 529 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Replenishment of GEF 529 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Replenishment year of AfDF 529 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Replenishment year of AsDF 529 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Economic growth rate 529 1.62 2.60 -8.97 10.33 
Inflation rate 529 2.69 2.44 -4.48 20.40 
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Unemployment rate 529 6.92 3.44 1.16 21.67 
Current account balance 529 -1986 25067 
-
200000 62438 
Deficit as of GDP 529 2.51 3.58 -5.85 19.10 
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Missingness map 
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Table A-8: The determinants of multi-bi aid according to random-effects regressions on imputed data 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
       
 International politics 
      
H1 KOF index: political globalization 0.165***    0.186*** 0.166*** 
H1 Multilateralism in foreign aid 0.056**    0.048* 0.047**  
H2 Country hosted G8 summit 0.929    0.699 0.851    
H3 Preference distance to IDA activities -0.043    -0.008 0.031    
H4 EU member -2.642***    -1.220 -0.741    
H5 Log(Peer effort) -0.808    -1.325 -1.255    
 
       
 Domestic politics 
      
H6 Partisan position  0.000   -0.105 -0.108    
H7 Preference diversity in government  0.067   -0.047 0.027    
H8 Aid minister change  -0.618*   -0.708** -0.661*   
H9 Perceived corruption control  0.777*   0.672*** 0.998*** 
 
       
 Donor preferences 
      
H10 Share of colonies among recipients   -7.344***  -5.808*** -6.967*** 
H10 Politics coefficient (partial R2 approach)   -0.214  -0.463** -0.268    
H11 Need coefficient (partial R2 approach)   0.056  -0.143 0.039    
 
       
 Aid agency characteristics  
      
H12 Number of recipient countries    0.000 -0.009 -0.003    
H12 Administrative costs    0.028 0.053 0.091    
H13 Number of aid agencies    0.105 0.070 0.182    
H14 Aid agency: type III    -1.995 -0.901 -2.706**  
H14 Aid agency: type IV    4.149*** 2.734*** 2.606**  
H15 QualityODA index    0.027 0.180 0.243    
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H16 Donor assessment of multilateral 
agencies    -1.983*** -1.030 -1.549    
H16 Chair in DAC working group    -0.017 0.528 0.170    
 
       
 Key controls 
      
 Log(GNI) 1.182 -0.089 -0.044 1.138 -0.203 -2.554    
 Log(Population) -1.538 0.230 -0.098 -1.616 -0.160 1.464    
 Change in public debt -0.002 0.015 0.003 0.001 -0.041 -0.031    
 Log(Total aid) -0.109** -0.118** -0.098* -0.081 -0.056 -0.080    
 Share of underreported aid -13.118*** -13.571*** -13.792*** -13.427*** -12.611*** -12.761*** 
 
       
 Further controls 
      
 Traditional latecomer      -3.988**  
 New donor      -0.199    
 Replenishment of IDA      0.040    
 Replenishment of GEF      0.553*   
 Replenishment of AfDF      -0.015    
 Replenishment of AsDF      -0.078    
 
       
 Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529    
 Donors 23 23 23 23 23 23    
 Within-R2 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.67    
 Between-R2 0.76 0.71 0.62 0.73 0.90 0.92    
p-values: * .1  ** .05   *** .01 
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Table A-9: The determinants of multi-bi aid according to fixed-effects regressions on imputed data 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
       
 International politics 
      
H1 KOF index: political globalization 0.129***    0.133*** 0.134*** 
H1 Multilateralism in foreign aid 0.054**    0.057** 0.057**  
H2 Country hosted G8 summit 0.789    0.784 0.78 
H3 Preference distance to IDA activities -0.104    -0.038 -0.039 
H5 Log(Peer effort) 0.113    0.041 0.026 
 
       
 Domestic politics 
      
H6 Partisan position  0.034   0.093 0.094 
H7 Preference diversity in government  0.182   0.171 0.17 
H8 Aid minister change  -0.558*   -0.504 -0.511 
H9 Perceived corruption control  -0.172   -0.35 -0.347 
 
       
 Donor preferences 
      
H10 Share of colonies among recipients   -8.327***  -7.928*** -7.893*** 
H10 Politics coefficient (partial R2 approach)   -0.259  -0.267 -0.268 
H11 Need coefficient (partial R2 approach)   0.282  0.299 0.294 
 
       
 Aid agency characteristics 
      
H12 Number of recipient countries    0.019 0.011 0.011 
H12 Administrative costs    -0.037 -0.033 -0.032 
H15 QualityODA index    0.193 0.437** 0.433**  
H16 Donor assessment of multilateral agencies    -2.947** -2.191* -2.192*   
H16 Chair in DAC working group    -0.413 -0.214 -0.213 
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 Key controls 
      
 Log(GNI) -8.513*** -7.829*** -8.718*** -8.330*** -10.297*** -10.270*** 
 Log(Population) -11.294 -13.704 -13.632 -19.605 -19.264** -19.268**  
 Change in public debt 0.017 0.028 0.019 0.025 0.009 0.011 
 Log(Total aid) -0.152*** -0.116* -0.117* -0.189** -0.134** -0.136**  
 Share of underreported aid -14.510*** -14.603*** -14.903*** -14.016*** -14.350*** -14.334*** 
 
       
 Further controls 
      
 Replenishment of IDA      -0.07 
 Replenishment of GEF      0.133 
 Replenishment of AfDF      0.038 
 Replenishment of AsDF      0.116 
 
       
 Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 
 Donors 23 23 23 23 23 23 
 Within-R2 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.70 
 Between-R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
p-values: * .1  ** .05   *** .01 
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Table A-10: EBA analysis – random-effects estimation (see Table A-11 for notes) 
 
 beta.lowest beta.highest pct.positive beta.mean beta.wmean tstat.mean pct.sgf95 type 
 
         
H1 KOF index: political globalization 0.186 0.242 100.0% 0.210 0.210 5.883 100.0% D 
H1 Multilateralism in foreign aid 0.032 0.086 100.0% 0.066 0.067 3.216 99.9% D 
H2 Country hosted G8 summit 0.358 1.005 100.0% 0.752 0.766 0.777 0.0% D 
H3 Preference distance to IDA activities -0.094 0.033 10.0% -0.049 -0.064 -1.017 0.4% D 
H4 EU member -2.492 1.274 32.3% -0.405 -0.779 -0.358 0.8% D 
H5 Log(Peer effort) -1.197 -0.269 0.0% -0.666 -0.715 -0.870 0.0% D 
H6 Partisan position -0.194 0.113 25.5% -0.031 -0.041 -0.224 0.0% D 
H7 Preference diversity in government -0.089 0.168 95.1% 0.095 0.115 0.534 0.0% D 
H8 Aid minister change -0.729 -0.471 0.0% -0.595 -0.598 -1.446 0.0% D 
H9 Perceived corruption control 0.327 1.126 100.0% 0.668 0.696 2.416 78.0% D 
H10 Share of colonies among recipients -8.562 -5.668 0.0% -7.168 -7.197 -3.139 100.0% D 
H10 Politics coefficient (partial R2 approach) -0.443 -0.154 0.0% -0.281 -0.289 -1.656 13.8% D 
H11 Need coefficient (partial R2 approach) -0.014 0.311 99.8% 0.122 0.143 0.439 0.0% D 
H12 Number of recipient countries -0.010 0.007 56.6% 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.0% D 
H12 Administrative costs -0.085 0.092 66.3% 0.0070 0.006 0.109 0.0% D 
H13 Number of aid agencies -0.014 0.190 99.5% 0.099 0.114 1.034 1.0% D 
H15 QualityODA index -0.166 0.264 48.5% 0.001 0.018 0.008 0.0% D 
H16 Donor assessment of multilateral agencies -2.285 -0.662 0.0% -1.874 -1.898 -1.771 14.7% D 
H16 Chair in DAC working group -0.355 0.575 34.5% -0.041 -0.060 -0.082 0.0% D 
H14 Aid agency: type III -2.532 0.303 0.4% -1.308 -1.498 -1.410 16.2% F 
H14 Aid agency: type IV 2.221 5.351 100.0% 3.501 3.578 2.578 91.3% F 
 Log(GNI) -1.333 3.278 92.3% 1.187 1.708 1.108 15.0% F 
 Log(Population) -3.812 1.150 6.7% -1.350 -1.954 -1.364 25.8% F 
 Change in public debt -0.035 0.031 62.4% 0.003 0.004 0.068 0.0% F 
 Log(Total aid) -0.201 0.019 0.3% -0.093 -0.109 -1.090 4.0% F 
 Share of underreported aid -14.487 -11.945 0.0% -13.098 -13.113 -13.793 100.0% F 
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Table A-11: EBA analysis – fixed-effects estimation  
 
 beta.lowest beta.highest pct.positive beta.mean beta.wmean tstat.mean pct.sgf95 type 
 
         
H1 KOF index: political globalization 0.116 0.170 100.0% 0.140 0.141 3.748 100.0% D 
H1 Multilateralism in foreign aid 0.045 0.071 100.0% 0.058 0.058 2.863 100.0% D 
H2 Country hosted G8 summit 0.562 0.998 100.0% 0.804 0.813 0.883 0.0% D 
H3 Preference distance to IDA activities -0.139 -0.049 0.0% -0.104 -0.108 -1.949 47.1% D 
H5 Log(Peer effort) -0.062 0.534 99.7% 0.277 0.315 0.405 0.0% D 
H6 Partisan position -0.031 0.155 89.2% 0.045 0.076 0.352 0.0% D 
H7 Preference diversity in government 0.113 0.222 100.0% 0.169 0.171 0.923 0.0% D 
H8 Aid minister change -0.681 -0.411 0.0% -0.562 -0.565 -1.485 0.0% D 
H9 Perceived corruption control -0.594 0.105 4.3% -0.246 -0.324 -0.626 0.0% D 
H10 Share of colonies among recipients -9.781 -6.478 0.0% -8.245 -8.288 -3.386 100.0% D 
H10 Politics coefficient (partial R2 approach) -0.400 -0.191 0.0% -0.288 -0.293 -1.777 21.3% D 
H11 Need coefficient (partial R2 approach) 0.219 0.511 100.0% 0.363 0.371 1.308 0.0% D 
H12 Number of recipient countries 0.008 0.022 100.0% 0.016 0.016 1.604 12.0% D 
H12 Administrative costs -0.113 0.052 18.5% -0.031 -0.048 -0.461 0.0% D 
H15 QualityODA index 0.086 0.441 100.0% 0.224 0.246 1.319 7.9% D 
H16 Donor assessment of multilateral agencies -3.266 -2.137 0.0% -2.749 -2.776 -2.558 100.0% D 
H16 Chair in DAC working group -0.735 -0.179 0.0% -0.473 -0.500 -0.976 0.0% D 
 Log(GNI) -11.445 -5.881 0.0% -8.591 -8.699 -3.561 100.0% F 
 Log(Population) -21.984 -10.153 0.0% -14.979 -15.348 -2.088 60.3% F 
 Change in public debt -0.001 0.037 100.0% 0.021 0.023 0.589 0.0% F 
 Log(Total aid) -0.218 -0.067 0.0% -0.144 -0.15 -1.745 29.8% F 
 Share of underreported aid -15.266 -13.732 0.0% -14.509 -14.515 -16.119 100.0% F 
Notes: EBA analysis with 4,378 draws (Table A-10) and respectively 2,176 draws (Table A-11). Type indicates whether a variable is doubtful (D) or free (F). Free 
variables include the variables in the last four rows and third-order time polynomials. Column headers: beta.lowest (lowest coefficient among all draws), beta.highest 
(highest coefficient among all draws), beta.mean (mean coefficient across all draws), beta.wmean (mean coefficient weighted by t-statistic), tstat.mean (mean t-
statistic across all draws), pct.sgf95 (percentage of significant coefficients), and pct.above.zero (percentage of coefficients above zero). 
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Table A-12: The determinants of multi-bi aid compared with other flows of aid according to fixed-effect SUR regressions 
 
 Bilateral aid Multilateral aid Multi-bi aid 
 
    
H1 KOF index: political globalization 0.041** 0.047** 0.136*** 
H1 Country hosted G8 summit -0.049 -0.060 0.763 
H3 Preference distance to IDA activities -0.023 -0.022 -0.030 
H5 Log(Peer effort) -0.084 -0.058 0.089 
H6 Partisan position -0.056 -0.057 0.113 
H7 Preference diversity in government -0.248*** -0.240** 0.228 
H8 Aid minister change 0.136 0.200 -0.481 
H9 Perceived corruption control 0.284 0.229 -0.438 
H10 Share of colonies among recipients 3.900*** 3.396** -9.031*** 
H10 Politics coefficient (partial R2 approach) -0.006 0.030 -0.231 
H11 Need coefficient (partial R2 approach) -0.128 -0.142 0.309 
H12 Number of recipient countries 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.006 
H15 QualityODA index -0.039 -0.086 0.406**  
H16 Donor assessment of multilateral agencies 0.248 0.177 -2.302**  
H16 Chair in DAC working group -0.156 -0.127 -0.184 
 Log(GNI) -0.340 -0.673 -10.780*** 
 Log(Population) -0.822 -1.619 -19.162*** 
 Change in public debt 0.014 0.010 0.002 
 Share of underreported aid -1.508*** -1.366*** -13.956*** 
 
    
 Adjusted R² 0.57 0.52 0.77    
 Observations 529 529 529    
p-values: * .1  ** .05   *** .01 
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Table A-13: Comparison of determinants of multi-bi aid between France and nine major donors of development assistance 
 
  FRA DEU GBR NED SWE DNK BEL USA CAN JPN 
H1 KOF index: political globalization 0.069 0.019 0.161*** 0.177*** 0.169* 0.205*** 0.310*** -0.104 0.038 0.192 
H2 Country hosted G8 summit 0.134 -0.057 0.053 . . . . -0.151* 0.064 0.063 
H3 Preference distance to IDA activities 0.460*** -0.193 0.054 -0.037 0.134 -0.042 -0.128 0.018 0.087 -0.471*** 
H5 Log(Peer effort) 0.183*** 0.176* 0.040 0.004 0.146** 0.115*** 0.077 0.089*** 0.148*** 0.228*** 
H6 Partisan position 0.281** -0.340** -0.067 0.145* -0.027 -0.034 0.027 0.005 0.118 0.079 
H7 Preference diversity in government 0.037 -0.081 0.008 0.106 -0.013 -0.139*** 0.259*** . . -0.289 
H8 Aid minister change -0.320* 0.136 0.051 -0.139 0.060 0.014 -0.052 -0.036 -0.033 0.020 
H9 Perceived corruption control -0.088 -0.132 -0.086 -0.127 0.146* -0.111* 0.035 -0.051 -0.355*** 0.353** 
H10 Share of colonies among recipients -0.046 . -0.097* -0.041 . . -0.034 0.001 . . 
H10 Politics coefficient (partial R2 approach) -0.034 0.192 0.025 0.019 -0.228** 0.057 -0.013 0.040 0.165* -0.126 
H11 Need coefficient (partial R2 approach) -0.117 0.060 0.089 0.046 0.044 -0.013 -0.047 0.091 0.142 0.125 
H12 Number of recipient countries 0.042 -0.296** 0.024 -0.036 -0.013 0.070 0.025 0.075* -0.040 0.099 
H15 QualityODA index -0.042 0.091 0.030 0.080 0.073 0.002 0.045 0.083 0.029 0.136 
H16 Donor assessment of multilateral agencies . . 0.020 . 0.108 0.000 . . . . 
H16 Chair in DAC working group 0.034 0.248** 0.009 -0.021 0.018 -0.003 -0.105 0.122* 0.153 . 
 Log(GNI) 0.250*** 0.109 0.053* 0.075** 0.183*** 0.041 0.095 0.080*** 0.098** 0.122 
 Log(Population) 0.177*** 0.125 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.142** 0.027 0.049 0.067*** 0.085** -0.044 
 Government debt as of GDP 0.033 0.185 0.004 -0.051 -0.270*** 0.034 0.036 -0.035 -0.008 0.044 
 Share of underreported aid -0.183* -0.261* -0.076 -0.153** -0.093 -0.005 -0.893*** -0.070 -0.196** -0.238 
Pseudo-R2 0.23 0.11 0.44 0.41 0.07 0.56 0.23 0.66 0.10 0.36 
 Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
p-values: * .1  ** .05   *** .01 
 
